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MULTISTATE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING:
CONFLICTS IN CONTEXT
CHARACTERIZED by contacts in many states with diverse laws, assignments
of accounts receivable give rise to exaggerated conflict of laws problems.
Accounts receivable financing enables businesses to meet continuing demands
for operating capital.' Sales of accounts, involved in old-line factoring, have
long been employed in the textile and related industries.2 Under this method
of financing, accounts receivable are assigned to and discounted by factors
who usually notify account debtors of the arrangement and collect the accounts.3
Sellers of accounts guaranty only authenticity of debts; factors assume
the risk of noncollection. 4 In modem receivables financing, on the other hand,
assignee banks or finance companies do not notify account debtors or collect
receivables ;5 and they retain recourse against assignors in case of default by
1. An account receivable may be defined as an indebtedness for services or merchandise
furnished, not evidenced by any formal written acknowledgment executed by the debtor.
Boas, Legal and Economic Aspects of Accounts Receivable Financing and Factoring, 59
Cow. L.J. 65 (1954).
"[T]he needs of small and medium size business for additional working funds have
been served primarily by various forms of both inventory and accounts receivable financ-
ing." Greenberg, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 1956 U. ILL. L. FORUM I
601. Such financing is used primarily by small business for which unsecured credit is un-
available. Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Financing: A Legal and Practical Look-See
(Part 1), The Practical Lawyer, Nov. 1956, p. 50. The receivables arrangement has the
characteristics of both short and long-term loans: short-term to the extent that the col-
lateral automatically extinguishes the obligation, see text at notes 11, 12 infra, and long-
term in the sense that a constant arrangement through the medium of revolving funds is
contemplated. Boas, supra.
2. PHELPS, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING AS A METHOD OF BUSINESS FINANCE
12 (CoMMRCIAL CREDIT COMPANY, STUDIES IN COMMERCIAL FINANCING, No. 2, 1957);
Silverman, Factoring as a Financing Device, 27 HARv. Bus. REV. 594, 597-98 (1949) ; Busi-
ness Week, Jan. 11, 1958, p. 84.
3. Ordinarily, the factor also relieves his client of the functions of credit investigations
and accounts receivable bookkeeping. PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12; Koessler, As-
signments of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. Rav. 40, 54 (1945) ; Silverman, supra note
2, at 596, 599; Business Week, Jan. 11, 1958, p. 86. The factor protects himself by approv-
ing accounts and checking prospective account debtors. Id. p. 84. The fee charged for the
risks and services of collection usually ranges between 1-1%%. When many small accounts
must be collected, fees may reach 2%; when collection is simple, they may be as low as
3Y4%. Id. p. 86. To facilitate credit investigations in nonrecourse financing, factors have
built up comprehensive credit files for the textile industry. The great cost of this has, of
course, been spread over the great number of accounts. But the necessity of developing
new files before entering new fields limits possibilities of expanding old-line factoring.
Silverman, supra note 2, at 598-99.
4. PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 12; Lowenstein, Assignments of Accounts Re-
ceivable and the Bankruptcy Act, 1. RUTGERS L. RE%,. 1, 6-7 (1947).
5. "Before the depression of the 1930's, banks did not often venture into the field of
lending on borrowers' accounts receivable ... because of the added expenses and trouble
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account debtors.0 Designed more as a security device than a sale, the modem
transaction is typically governed by a basic contract to assign or "sell" ex-
isting and future accounts in exchange for continuing credit.7 The borrower
agrees not to assign to another concern, and the lender is free to notify account
debtors at any time as well as to refuse advances on the basis of precarious
involved. Nevertheless, seeking for profitable loan outlets, the banks have gradually moved
into this field that previously was the special province of the finance companies." THOmfAs,
OUR MODERN BANKING AND MONETARY SYSTEM 165-66 (3d ed. 1957). Modern receiv-
ables financing is handled primarily by finance companies and commercial banks, with
factors-mainly the large and few "Fourth Avenue Houses"--concentrating on nonre-
course financing. Koessler, supra note 3, at 52-56; Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 6-7.
6. Since in modem accounts receivable financing arrangements the borrower operates
his own credit department, does his own bookkeeping and collects the accounts, the
lender does not have the day by day control over credits and collections characteristic of
old-line factoring. Hence, advances in nonnotification financing are usually made
with recourse. PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16. But nonnotification financing
need not always be coupled with a right of recourse. Thus, some finance companies are
beginning to take accounts either entirely without recourse or with limited liability on the
part of the assignor for credit losses. Id. at 61; Kupfer, supra note 1, P. 55; Drake, Out-
look for Commercial Finance Companies and Factors for 1956, The Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, March 8, 1956, p. 6.
Notification financing is in some ways preferable to nonnotification arrangements. The
assignee need not rely on the borrower to forward all remittances or in general to comply
with the strictures of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), note 17 infra. Once notified
of the arrangement, an account debtor pays the assignor at his peril. See note 46 infra.
For this very reason, however, the plan is unacceptable to many potential borrowers who
prefer to maintain direct relationships with customers. In addition, assignors fear that
customers burdened with the necessity of determining the payee of remittances
might look elsewhere for their business. See Boas, supra note 1, at 59-60. On the other
hand, the interest rate for accounts receivable financing is almost twice that charged by
Ad-line factors, i.e., about 12% as against 6-7%. Business Week, Jan. 11, 1958, p. 86.
7. "[F]inance companies generally use the technique of purchasing open accounts,
while many commercial banks follow the procedure of lending on the security of a pledge
-f such receivables. [Usually because they lack either express or implied statutory power
I purchase accounts receivable. DEixON, SECURED TRANsAcTIONS 60 (1955).] In both
-ses the advances are made with recourse to the customer for credit losses and without
-otice to his trade debtors." PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 16; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV.
""92 (1952). Whatever label is given to the transaction by the parties, it seems meaning-
less to call a modem receivables financing arrangement a sale as long as the assignee is
guaranteed full recovery of the debt plus charges from the assignor. One reason for the
practice may be to escape usury statutes which apply to loans but not to sales and thus
permit any discount in a sale. Yet in Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 163
P.2d 869 (1945), when a purported sale was rescindable by the assignee after the account
debtor's default, the court held that for usury purposes the label need not control and
remanded the case for determination of whether the usury statute applied. Cf. In re L.
Gandolfi & Co., 113 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1940) ("while the agreement took the form of a
contract of sale, it is tolerably clear that the arrangement was in reality one for loans on
the security of assigned accounts"; nonusury context). But cf. In re Mesibovsky, 200 Fed.
562 (2d Cir. 1912) ; Spain v. Talcott, 165 App. Div. 815, 152 N.Y. Supp. 611 (1st Dep't
1915).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
accounts.8 Pursuant to the agreement, the assignor periodically delivers sched-
ules of accounts to the assignee and receives an agreed percentage of their
sum.9 Differentials between security and loans afford safety margins against
noncollection, insolvency and dishonesty. 10 As the assignor collects receivables
and remits proceeds, he delivers new schedules of accounts and acquires from
the assignee further advances in the same ratio." Thus, payment comes auto-
matically from the security, and the proportion of loans outstanding to accounts
assigned generally remains constant.12
Since the second World War, accounts receivable financing has experienced
accelerated growth. The business community formerly regarded assignments
of accounts receivable as distress measures portending insolvency.13 Com-
mercial disparagement was substantially allayed, however, by the increasing
practice, authorized by the Federal Assignment of Claims Act, of assigning
defense contracts.' 4 Moreover, with unprecedented business growth, rising
taxes and inflation heightening pressures on working capital, businessmen
realized the necessity of augmenting credit resources by hypothecating or
selling accounts. 15 Thus impelled, accounts receivable financing attained com-
mercial recognition as a respectable method of securing revolving credit. 16
8. Note, 101. U. PA. L. Rzv. 392, 393 (1952). But see Koessler, supra note 3, at 56,
stating that nonnotification agreements generally provide for no notification except in ex-
traordinary contingencies, such as the assignor's insolvency.
Receivables financing agreements usually contain acceleration clauses operative at the
will of the assignee or when he feels insecure. The UNIFORMT COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-208
and the majority rule hold that the assignee may accelerate only if he believes in good
faith that the prospect of payment is impaired. Kupfer, Assignments of Accounts Receiv-
able: A Legal and Practical Look-See (Part 2), The Practical Lawyer, Dec. 1956, pp. 55,
64.
9. Delivery is often made daily. NEw YoRm LAW REvISION COMMISSION, ASSIGN-
MENTS OF AccouNTs RECEIVABLE 285 (1946). Percentages vary from 70-95% of the face
value of the assigned accounts. PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 38.
10. See Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 392-93 (1952).
11. See note 29 infra for further discussion of such financing arrangements.
12. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 392, 394 (1952). The "automatic payment" feature key-
notes the desirability of receivables security. Unless many accounts prove worthless, de-
faults cannot occur and costly foreclosure proceedings are unnecessary. See Note, 66
YA.E L.. 257 (1956).
13. See Nmv YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 9, at 6; PH-LPS,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 16-17, 63. Even today, a creditor sometimes takes assignments as
further security from a sinking debtor. But this is the exception rather than the rule.
Koessler, supra note 3, at 59.
14. 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). See
PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 61 ; Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 2.
15. PHELPS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 58-59. The reason for increased use of receiv-
ables financing in the last few years has been stated as (1) the growing corporate need
for liquid capital and (2) the difficulty of obtaining bank loans under the tight money con-
ditions prevalent since 1952. Business Week, Jan. 11, 1958, p. 84.
16. "[F]ar from being a 'symptom of financial distress,' this sort of loan has become
the stepping stone on which a borrower can lift himself to a sounder position." Loans on
Accounts Receivable, 55 U.S. IwESTOR 1985, 2023 (1944). See also Reese, Highlights
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But expanding usage also resulted in multistate transactions and, consequently,
exposure to divergent state laws.
Disparate state treatment stems largely from the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,
which requires borrowers to account to lenders for the proceeds of assigned re-
ceivables. 17 Benedict invalidates nonnotification assignments when an assignor's
retention of proceeds is expressly permitted or the assignee's consent may be
implied from his failure to demand prompt remission of-police--collected
amounts.1 s Thus, absent substitution of new accounts, a borrower who does
From the Sontherm Consumer Credit Clinic, Credit Currents, Feb. 1952, p. 25; SCHULTZ
& REINHARDT, CREDIT AND COLLECTION MANAGEMENT 568 (2d ed. 1954). The volume of
nonnotification financing done by finance companies and factors rose from $536 million in
1941 to $5.6 billion in 1956. SAULNIER & JACOBY, AccouxTs REE iVAiLE FINANCING 36
(1943); Drake, The Commercial Finance Industry's Trade Group, in NATIONAL COM-
MIMCIAL FINANCE CONFERENCE, INC., TwELFTrH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE COM-
.'ERCIAL FINANCE INDUSTRY 5 (1956). The combined total of factoring and loans against
receivables in 1957 is estimated at $11 billion, 2y2 times that of 1946. Business Week,
Jan. 11, 1958, p. 84. Modern receivables financing comprises $6.5 billion, old-line factoring
$4.5 billion. Id. p. 86. Although mostly small and medium sized firms make use of
accounts receivable financing, large firms as well are increasingly employing this security
device. PHELrs, op. cit. supra note 2, at 62.
17. 268 U.S. 353 (1925). Benedict, a judicially imposed rule obtaining in many states,
see Annot., 85 A.L.R. 222 (1933); Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 598 (1949); Note, 101 U.
PA. L. rEv. 392 (1952), requires that the lender "police" his loans on pain of losing all
his collateral under a fraud-in-law doctrine. The borrower must turn over to the lender
all proceeds of assigned accounts as he receives them or at regular intervals, usually by
endorsing checks and placing them in an account upon which he cannot draw. In addition,
the assignee must set up rather elaborate machinery to check the borrower's actions. Dun-
ham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARV. L. REV. 588, 593 (1949).
He ordinarily takes monthly audits of the assignor's books and operations and periodically
makes spot checks by way of direct correspondence between the auditing concern and ac-
count debtors selected at random. Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Financing: A Legal and
Practical Look-See (Part 1), The Practical Lawyer, Nov. 1956, pp. 50, 55. For further
discussion of practices which have and have not been allowed, see NEw Yoax LAw RE-
vISION Colmn nssIoN, op. cit. snpra note 9, at 142-46; Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 598, 600-
03 (1949). For the possible effect of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act on this
doctrine, see Cohen & Gerber, .Mlortgages of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEo. L.J. 555, 571
(1941).
Benedict v. Ratner has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Lowenstein, sufpra note 4, at
13-14; Note, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 392, 400 (1952). Yet the finance companies themselves
do not urge abolition of the rule. Its requirements represent minimal standards which
responsible lenders observe absent Benedict to prevent dissipation of collateral and "kiting"
of assignments. Id. at 401. Existence of the doctrine as a legal requirement thus facilitates
imposing the necessary practices on borrowers who may otherwise feel that they are being
distrusted. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMERCIAL RECEIVABLE COMPANIES, INC.,
EIGHTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE COMMERCIAL FINANCE INDUSTRY 170-74 (1952);
ef. Malcolm, Explanation and Analysis of Massachusetts Honse Bill No. 642, Mass. L.Q.,
Oct. 1945, pp. 26, 37. Another and perhaps equally important reason may be that the
finance companies feel they have acquired a skill in navigating among the shoals of Bene-
diet, removal of which would invite other commercial lenders to enter the receivables financ-
ing waters.
18. Contracts satisfying Benedict will not save an assignment if, in practice, the as-
19581
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not segregate returned merchandise or who makes price adjustments altering the
amounts due from account debtors will jeopardize his assignee's security interest
in all accounts. 19 Several courts have refused to adopt Benedict;20 others
may endorse the rule generally with respect to retention of proceeds but reject
its stricter applications to returned goods and price adjustments. 21 Even in
those states which adhere to the full scope of the Benedict doctrine, dominion
over proceeds does not preclude validity if the assignor substitutes receivables
of equal value for the dissipated security.22
In addition to Benedict, common-law rules regarding assignment of future
accounts and priority between assignees of the same account may impair an
assignee's security interest. Assignments of debts to arise in the future are
often held ineffective as against garnishing creditors or subsequent assignees
unless perfected, upon creation of the accounts, by further acts of assignment.23
signee permits violations of the rule. Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
1930).
19. The rationale for extending Benedict is that dominion over returned goods or the
right to make price adjustments is tantamount to dominion over proceeds. See, e.g., Lee
v. State Bank & Trust Co., 54 F.2d 518 (21 Cir. 1931) (returned goods amounted to less
than IY4% of the assigned accounts, yet assignment held invalid) ; Zydney v. New York
Credit Men's Ass'n, 1.13 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1940) (returned goods) ; Peterson v. National
Discount Corp., 179 Wash. 108, 35 P.2d 1097 (1934) (credits and adjustment). Once the
security interest in part of the accounts is thus invalidated, the entire assignment may
fail under the "part bad-all bad" rule of Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926). But
see In re Hanover Milling Co., 31 F.2d 442 (D. Minn. 1929). Courts vary in determining
the permissible degree of dominion over returned goods. See, e.g., In re L. Gandolfi & Co.,
113 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1940) (basic agreement required assignor periodically to deliver lists
of returned goods; returned goods were not segregated and assignor was lax in reporting
returns; assignments nevertheless upheld) ; Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp., 134 F.2d 562 (2d
Cir. 1943) (to invalidate assignment, assignee must have known of and agreed to resale
of returned merchandise by assignor for own benefit). For statutory changes of this rule,
see note 45 infra.
20. See, e.g., In re United Fuel & Supply Co., 250 Mich. 325, 230 N.V. 164 (1930);
cf. It re Robert Jenkins Corp., 17 F.2d 555 (1st Cir. 1927).
21. This approach is suggested by the accounts receivable statutes passed in recent
years, which have rejected only Benedict's application to returned goods and adjustments.
See note 45 infra.
22. Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Benedict v. Rather, 268 U.S. at 364 n.18, sug-
gested that the result would have been different if the underlying agreement, while per-
mitting the assignor to collect the assigned accounts, had required him to substitute other
accounts of equal value. Accord, Clark v. Iselin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 360 (1874) ; Second
Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 189 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951). See also Lowenstein, supra note 4,
at 9-11; Notes, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rav. 598, 601 (1949), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 392, 395-96
(1952). But factors are wary of using substitution and rarely resort to this device. Id. at
394.
23. Courts often reason that an assignee of accounts to arise in the future obtains
mere equitable title which is subordinate to the legal title later acquired by other assignees
or attaching creditors. State Factors Corp. v. Sales Factors Corp., 257 App. Div. 101, 12
N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1939). New York law, however, is unclear. See NEW YORK LAW
REVISION COIfMSSION, ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTs REcEIVABLE 56-59, 94-104 (1946). See
also Taylor v. Barton Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N.E. 43 (1917); First Nat'l Bank
(Vol. 67:402
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"Automatic perfection" doctrines, endorsed in other states, permit contracts
assigning future accounts to encumber receivables as they come into existence.24
Similarly, opposing views prevail with respect to priority of liens asserted in
the same accounts by two good-faith assignees. The majority, or American,
rule accords priority to liens established first in time,25 while the minority,
English, doctrine favors the claims of assignees who first notify account debtors.26
v. Campbell, 193 S.W. 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). Nevertheless, debts to become due
under an existing contract are assignable in most jurisdictions. See RESTATEMENT, CON-
mAcrs § 154 (1932).
In ordinary receivables arrangements, the periodic delivery of schedules of new accounts
constitutes the further act required. Precedent in some states holds the date of perfection
to relate back to the original assignment. Of little utility outside of bankruptcy, relation-
back doctrines have been rendered unavailing by amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. NEW
You LAW RgwsIoN CoImmissIoN, op. cit. szpra at 90-93.
24. E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907) (Michigan law);
Baskin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 190 Ark. 448, 79 S.W.2d 724 (1935) ; Girard Trust Co. v.
Standard Gas Co., 93 N.J. Eq. 307, 115 Atl. 910 (Ch. 1921). But cf. Stokely Bros. & Co.
v. Conklin, 131 N.J. Eq. 552 (Ch. 1942) (apparently requiring that the account have a poten-
tial existence). This is also the English rule. See In re Lind, [1915] 2 Ch. 345; Annot., 72
A.L.R. 856 (1931). For an exhaustive discussion of this problem, see NEv YORK LAW
REVISION COMMIssIoN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 44-104. For statutory changes of the
common law in this field, see note 44 infra. A discussion of the desirability of the floating
lien appears in NEW YORK LAW REviSION COnMISSION, STUDY OF UNIFORM COTTMERCIAL
CODE, ARTicE NINE 135-95 (1955).
25. The American rule, formerly in the minority, gained currency through the years.
See Annot, 110 A.L.R. 774 (1937) ; Koessler, supra note 3, at 63-64. For a listing of
states presently adhering to the rule, either by court decision or by statute, see note 32
infra. Two versions, the New York and Massachusetts rules, obtain. The former recog-
nizes no exception to the proposition that the first assignment in time prevails, Superior
Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st Dep't 1925),
while the Massachusetts rule holds that a second assignee who without knowledge of a
previous assignment collects debts from account debtors may retain the proceeds, Rabin-
owitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 235 Mass. 102, 126 N.E. 289 (1920). The Restatement of
Contracts elaborated the Massachusetts rule into the "four horsemen" doctrine, which lists
three other circumstances under which a subsequent good-faith assignee for value may
prevail: (1) by obtaining a judgment against the original obligor (account debtor) ; (2)
by entering into a new contract with the obligor by way of novation; (3) by obtaining
delivery of a token in writing, surrender of which is necessary for the enforcement of the
obligor's debt. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 173(b) (1932). For the origin of these ex-
ceptions, see Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 19.
26. A few jurisdictions still adhere to the English rule, which received its name from
the case of Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828). See, e.g., Wade v.
Security Say. & Commercial Bank, 69 App. D.C. 226, 99 F.2d 995 (1938); Canton Ex-
change Bank v. Yazoo County, 144 Miss. 57§, 602, 109 So. 1, 4 (1926) ; Moran v. Adker-
son, 168 Tenn. 372, 79 S.W.2d 44 (1935). For a list of other states which followed this
rule until accounts receivable statutes, notes 32, 33 infra, were enacted, see Koessler,
supra note 3, at 70 n.105. The majority of these states required notification only as against
a competing assignee not an attaching creditor on the theory that the latter acquired no
better rights than the assignor had. Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing: The
Real Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable Financing, 64 HAgv. L. REv. 62,
65 (1950).
1958]
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After enactment of the Chandler Act, the choice between the two rules became
critical.27 Section sixty made certain assignments preferential and voidable if
subsequent bona fide assignees could obtain superior liens within four months
of bankruptcy.28 Since subsequent assignees could always prevail, nonnotifi-
cation financing arrangements governed by the English rule were rendered
vulnerable to invalidation.
29
27. Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575, 52 STAT. 840 (codified, as amended, in scat-
tered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
28. 52 STAT. 869 (1938) (amended by 64 STAT. 24 (1950), 11 US.C. § 96 (1952)).
29. In the much publicized case of Corn Exchange Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,
318 U.S. 434 (1943), the Court invalidated a nonnotification assignment executed in Penn-
sylvania, then an English rule state. To reach this conclusion under § 60, the Court had
to find that, among other things, the transfer was made for an antecedent debt and within
four months of bankruptcy. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1952). Although the
assignment was, in fact, effected concurrently with the loan (less than four months before
bankruptcy) the Court deemed the transfer made at the time of bankruptcy, and thus on
account of an antecedent debt. For § 60 provided that a transfer "shall be deemed to have
been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser from
the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so
transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein." 52 STAT. 869 (1938)
(amended by 64 STAT. 24 (1950), 11 US.C. § 96 (1952)). And a subsequent assignee in
an English rule state, reasoned the Court, could have acquired rights superior to those of
the lender by giving the account debtor notice of the assignment.
In In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943), a district court held
that, even under the Massachusetts version of the American rule, an assignment similar
to that in Klquder was invalid under § 60, since, according to the four horsemen exception,
a subsequent good-faith assignee could prevail by, e.g., collecting proceeds or obtaining a
judgment against the account debtor. See note 25 supra. Vardaman was severely criticized
by commentators, e.g., Koessler, supra note 3, at 85, and courts, e.g., In re Rosen, 157
F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835 (1947). With state statutory elimina-
tion of the four horsemen, the Vardaman problem became moot until Kansas incorporated
one of the horsemen in its recording act. Finally, 1 5 of § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act
as amended in 1950, 64 STAT. 25 (1950), 11. U.S.C. § 96(a) (5) (1952), rejected the Var-
daman result by providing that transfers actually made for present consideration cannot
be deemed unperfected merely because other lien creditors might have prevailed through
acts "which require the agreement or concurrence of any third party"-for example, by
satisfying one of the four horsemen conditions. See H.R. ,R-'. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1949). Gearing the time of perfection to a judicial lien creditor test,
rather than the former bona fide purchaser rule, the amendment also substantially pro-
tected assignments from English rule vulnerability. See note 26 supra. But, since most
states had enacted statutes rejecting the English rule by 1950, this effect was negligible.
Conwill & Ellis, supra note 26, at 76-78.
The ordinary receivables financing arrangement may appear at first glance very much
like a single loan of a given sum made at the beginning of the arrangement and secured
by new collateral as the old collateral expires. To guard against a § 60 attack on the ground
that all collateral assigned within four months of bankruptcy was given for an antecedent
debt, the arrangement should follow the outline shown in text at notes 8-12 supra. Thus,
as proceeds come in, the loan is paid off-legally and for accounting purposes. Simultane-
ously, new accounts are assigned for new consideration, i.e., the extension of new credit,
although from the assignor's point of view, the receipt of such new credit is roughly equi-
valent to receiving the proceeds of old accounts, and, in fact, the agreement may be couched
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The thirty-seven state statutes 0 passed to obviate this result amplify dis-
in terms of releasing the old collateral in return for new accounts. These arrangements
are upheld as creating no preference if the release is made at the same time or shortly after
the new assignments. Lowenstein, supra note 4, at 9. However, viewing the revolving
credit arrangement as a series of individual transactions may give rise to a problem. In
Wolf v. Aero Factors Corp., 126 F. Supp. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 291 (2d
Cir. 1955), some groups of accounts assigned within four months of bankruptcy proved
collectible, others not; the trustee argued that the credit extended at any one time was
secured only by the accounts assigned at that time and by no others, so that part of the
loan was unsecured even though the total amount of credit was less than the total amount
of outstanding and collectible collateral. The court rejected this reasoning and held that
the accounts were assigned and credit extended pursuant to the terms of the factoring
agreement which provided that the assignee could apply excess collateral to any indebted-
ness then or thereafter becoming due from the bankrupt. Since none of the assignments
were preferential, except in so far as some collateral was applied to antecedent indebtedness
rather than present or subsequent debts, and since they were made as part of a single
agreement, the assignee could set off the credit extended on the worthless accounts against
the excess of the other collateral under the "mutual debts or mutual credits" rule of § 68
of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 108 (1952).
But, considering the arrangement a series of individual transactions, a court could hold
assignments preferences to the extent they exceed advances made simultaneously and rule
that under § 60(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(c) (1952),
later advances may be set off against preferential transfers only if such advances were
made "without security of any kind."
30. See notes 32, 33 in!ra. This Comment will not consider the conflicts problems
raised by factors' lien recording acts. Most of these acts permit the financing parties to
obtain liens both on inventory and accounts arising from the sale of inventory subject to
liens. Note, 101. U. PA. L. REv. 392, 398 (1952). Although substantively related to ac-
counts receivable financing, factors' liens present distinct conflicts problems because tangible
property as well as accounts are involved in the security arrangement. Unlike conflicts rules
regarding receivables financing, the doctrine governing transfers of chattel interests-lex
situs-almost universally prevails. See LALIvE, THE TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN THE CON-
FLIcr OF LAWS 48-59 (1955) ; ZAMH ou, TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 74-75 (1956). But see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567 (1957), advocating lex loci
commerciendi for trust receipt problems arising in bankrtuptcy. And to preserve the utility
of these statutes, factors' liens encumbrancing accounts upon sale of liened inventory should
be governed by the same conflicts rule which pertains to the charged merchandise. Accord-
ingly, the only factors' lien statutes relevant to this Comment are those embracing accounts
receivable which need not arise from the sale of liened inventory. However, the New York
and New Jersey statutes, which contain such provisions with respect to after-acquired ac-
counts, are conditioned on notification of account debtors. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :44-183
(Supp. 1957) ; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 45. Assignees are unlikely to permit the validity
of security to hinge on assignors' conscientious notification. Moreover, assignors most like-
ly prefer delivering schedules of new accounts to notifying their customers. Thus, receiv-
ables financers in these states probably ignore the factors' lien statutes and conform assign-
ments to common-law standards.
The only factors' lien act which seems effectively adaptable to pure accounts receivable
operations and therefore within the scope of this Comment is the New Hampshire statute.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 446:1-:10 (Supp. 1957) ; see note 44 infra.
The possibility that assignments can be upgheld when they satisfy a chattel mortgage
filing statute, despite noncompliance with an accounts receivable filing act, was recognized
in In re Steele, 122 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.N.C. 1954). Applicability of chattel mortgage
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parities among state substantive laws.31 Validation statutes codify the American
rule simply by repudiating notification requirements. 32 Recording statutes
achieve the same effect by substituting general notice filing for assignees' notifi-
cation of account debtors. 33 While the two principal types of legislation thus
statutes, while increasing diversity of state law, would not alter the policy considerations in-
volved in choosing a conflicts rule for receivables assignments.
31. The Fifth Circuit took judicial notice that the Chandler amendment of § 60
prompted enactment of the Florida act. M. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923, 927-
28 n.4 (5th Cir. 1955) ; accord, Costello v. Bank of America, 141 F. Supp. 225, 227-29
(N.D. Cal. 1956). See also Koessler, supra note 3, at 50.
32. Validation statutes enact the New York version which upholds assignments first
in time irrespective of any action taken by subsequent assignees. See note 25 supra. Such
statutes are in effect in fourteen states: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-805 (Supp. 1955) ; CoNN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 6718-26 (,Supp. 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, §§ 220-22 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1957) ; IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-2101 to -2104 (Supp. 1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C.
113, §§ 171-73 (Supp. 1957) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 8, § 2 (Supp. 1956) ; Micm. STAT. ANN. %9
19.841-.851 (Supp. 1955) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 521.01-.07 (Supp. 1957) ; N.H. RMV STAT.
ANN. §§ 333:1- :7 (Supp. 1957) ; OP. REV. STAT. § 80.010 (1955) ; R.I. Acts 1943, c. 1345,
§§ 1-2; S.D. CODE § 51.0803 (Supp. 1952) ; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-5 to -7 (1956) ; Wis.
STAT. § 241.28 (1955).
In contrast with filing statutes, see note 33 infra, validation acts are generally short.
Besides affirming the priority of the assignee first in time, they preserve to account debtors
the right of discharge upon good-faith payment to someone other than the assignee.
Massachusetts, where a validation statute was passed in 1945, MAss. ANN. LAWS c.
107A, §§ 1-6 (Supp. 1957), recently enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, effective Oct.
1, 1958, Mass. Acts 1957, c. 765, Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1957, p. 22, and must now be classed
among the recordation states. See note 33 infra.
Four states adhere to the nonnotification rule by court decision. Columbia Finance &
Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 76 S.W. 156 (1903) ; Moorestown Trust Co.
v. Buzby, 109 N.J. Eq. 409, 157 Atl. 663 (Ch. 1931); McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 266
App. Div. 599, 42 N.Y.S.2d 551. (1st Dep't-1943), reaffirming the leading case of Fortunato
v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277, 41 N.E. 572 (1895) ; Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City Nat'l Bank,
95 F. Supp. 276 (N.D.W. Va. 1950). Montana courts also seem to follow the doctrine.
General Elec. Co. v. Black, 19 Mont. 110, 47 Pac. 639 (1897).
On possible application of factors' lien recording acts to accounts receivable financing
in certain validation states, see notes 30 supra, 45 infra.
33. Filing statements usually require no more information than the names of the as-
signee and assignor, plus their intention to conduct receivables financing. Compare UNi-
Foam TRUST REcEIPTs AcT § 13. Twenty-two states now have such statutes: ALA. CODE
tit. 39, §§ 207-14 (Supp. 1955) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. §§ 62-801 to -809 (Supp. 1952) ; CAL
Civ. CODE §§ 3017-29; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-2-1 to -7 (Supp. 1955); FLA. STAT.
ANN. 9§ 524.01-.06 (Supp. 1956) ; GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1806 to -1813 (1955) ; IDAHO CODE
ANN. §9 64-901 to -907 (Supp. 1957) ; IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 539.7-.15 (Supp. 1956) ; KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-801 to -807 (Supp. 1955) ; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3101-:3110
(Supp. 1957); Mass. Acts 1957, c. 765, see note 32 supra; Mo. ANN. STAT. §9 410.010-.060
(Supp. 1957); NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 69-601 to -621 (Supp. 1955) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-77
to -85 (Supp. 1955) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1325.01-.08 (Page Supp. 1957); OsaA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 631-37 (Supp. 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, §§ 9-103, 9-106,
9-204, 9-302, 9-401 (1) (a) (Supp. 1956) ; S.C. CoDE §§ 45-201 to -211 (Supp. 1955) ; TEM.
Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 260-1 (Supp. 1957); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-1 to -6 (Supp.
1957) ; Vt. Acts 1953, No. 164; WASH. REv. CODE §§ 63.16.010-.110 (Supp. 1957) ; Hawaii
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diminish one source of diversity, they combine to produce new variances among
state treatment of accounts receivable financing. For example, two states
permit an assignee to retain proceeds he collected without knowledge of a pre-
vious assignment.34 Under several recording acts, a subsequent assignee can,
and Puerto Rico have also enacted recording statutes. Hawaii Sess. Laws 1951, Ser. C-210:
Act 45; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 581-88 (Supp. 1956).
The UNIFont ComimciALc CODE § 9-302 (Mass., Pa.) does not require recording un-
less the assignor transfers a significant part of his outstanding accounts to one as-
signee. The Pennsylvania version also makes recording unnecessary when the assignment
is for collection only or for reassignment by a professional assignee. The UNIFORM Com-
TMERCIAL CODE (1957 off. ed.) does not require filing where the assignee is a collecting
bank and in reassignment cases, but only as against creditors and transferees of the original
assignor.
The Michigan act, although basically a validation statute, see note 32 supra, requires
filing of any assignment designed as security for an antecedent debt, except an assignment
made pursuant to an agreement entered into at or before the time the indebtedness was first
incurred. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19-842 (Supp. 1955). This provision seems designed to
prevent preferences obtained by back-dating yet exempts from the recording requirement
regular receivables arrangements based on an underlying contract. But since governing
contracts can also be back-dated, the filing requirement appears to be of little value, espe-
cially since § 19.846 of the statute abolishes the rule of Benedict v. Rather. See note 45
infra.
In the first few years following the Klauder case, see note 29 szpra, validation statutes
were preferred by states wishing to preclude a reoccurrence of that case. Thus, while all
validation statutes were enacted between 1943 and 1.946, only eight states (Cal., Idaho, Mo.,
N.C., Ohio, S.C., Tex., Utah) had enacted filing statutes by 1946. On the whole, finance
companies favored validation statutes while banks preferred filing. Koessler, supra note 3,
at 57, 87. See also recommendation of the NEW YORK LAW REVISION CommtissioN, As-
SIGNMENTS OF AccouNTs RECEIVABLE 6 (1946). Finance company hostility to recording
seems due to fear of borrowers' unwillingness to publicize the "hocking" of their accounts,
id. at 279; PHELPS, AccouNTs RECEIVABLE FINANCING AS A METHOD OF BusINEss Fi-
NANCE 16-17, 63 (1956), and to apprehension that competitors might use recording files
to steal customers. Koessler, supra note 3, at 60, 99; NEW YoRx LAW REVISION Commis-
sIoN, ASSIGNMENTS OF AccOUNTS RECEIVABLE 279 (1946). The banks, on the other hand,
felt that filing was necessary to remove the danger of double assignments. Koessler, szpra
note 3, at 57-58 n.49.
Most filing acts differ considerably, except for a group of five substantially identical
statutes, the Idaho act having served as a model for those in Colorado, Florida, Oklahoma
and Utah.
North Dakota alone has a bookmarking statute, N.D. REV. CODE §§ 9-1.108, 9-1109
(Supp. 1949), which eliminates the need to notify account debtors, but requires, for per-
fection, that assignments be noted on the assignor's books. The statute represents an at-
tempted compromise between advocates of recording acts-mainly banks and the bankruptcy
bar-and proponents of validation statutes-the finance companies. Yet it fails to accom-
plish the purpose of either-an effective degree of publicity in the one case, quick and
easy perfection of assignments in the other-and thus pleases neither faction. See, e.g.,
Koessler, supra note 3, at 95; NEW YORK LAW REVISION CoMMISSION, ASsIGNMENTS OF
AccouNTs RECEIVABLE 263 (1946). Pennsylvania and Georgia, formerly bookmarking
states, Pa. Laws 1941, No. 255; Ga. Laws 1943, No. 178, at 263, have wisely abandoned
this position by enacting filing statutes.
34. The Kansas and Vermont filing statutes allow an assignee who first recorded to
recover proceeds from another assignee, except to the extent that the other assignee
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by filing, defeat only prior assignments of which he is unaware.3, Yet, other
statutes favor recorded assignments despite knowledge of previous transfers."
Still other recording acts indicate that filing does not protect an assignee
against prior unrecorded assignments.3 Statutes also differ on: place of filing
acquired his title or interest in good faith and for value. The language, identical in both
statutes, even permits interpretation favoring an attaching creditor who obtains proceeds
in good faith. Moreover, in California a simple contract creditor who had extended credit
before filing was allowed to recover proceeds already collected by the assignee. Menick
v. Carson, 96 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Cal. 1951), discussed in note 39 infra. On the other hand,
most statutes, both validation and recording, provide specifically or by clear implication
that the assignee who first perfects his assignment may recover from any other assignee
who collects the proceeds. The validation statutes of Maryland, Oregon and Rhode Island,
however, are silent on this point. RESTAT mNT, CONTRACTs § 173(b) (1932), permits
a subsequent assignee to retain proceeds collected in good faith.
35. Under the statutes of Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Ver-
mont, the assignee who records takes subject to prior assignments of which he has written
notice; in Missouri, he takes subject to such assignments if he has actual knowledge of
them; and in Alabama, California, Washington, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, filing protects
against subsequent assignees without notice, the statutes thus implying that a subsequent
assignee with notice cannot prevail, even if he files, against a prior unrecorded assignment.
The Idaho and Utah statutes define a protected assignee as the "owner of a protected as-
signment who took the same in good faith and for value." The Texas act contains language
to the same effect. Knowledge of a prior though unrecorded assignment would clearly
seem to disqualify an assignee from the protected category. Under the Nebraska statute,
an attaching creditor, as opposed to a subsequent assignee, need only have actual rather
than written notice of an unrecorded assignment for his interest to be subordinated to
that of the assignee.
For problems occasioned by the theory that knowledge of a branch bank is imputed
to the whole system, see Comment, 56 MicH. L. REv. 90 (1957).
36. The Iowa, North Carolina, Ohio and South Carolina statutes state that, as be-
tween two assignees of the same debt, the one who first files prevails. The California and
Washington statutes also contain such language, but seem to prefer an assignee who first
records only when he is ignorant of a prior assignment. See note 35 supra.
37. Thus, the filing statutes of Arizona, Louisiana, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the
North Dakota bookmarking statute, hold that a perfected assignment gives the assignee
superior rights to those of existing and subsequent creditors and subsequent (but not existing)
assignees. The Idaho and Utah statutes favor a recording assignee against "purchasers from
and creditors of his assignor whose rights in the account arose after the making of the pro-
tected assignment thereof." Both groups, particularly the first, imply that a good-faith
recording assignee cannot prevail against a prior unrecorded assignment. Little commer-
cial significance attends these differences, for double assignments are relatively rare, see
note 50 infra, and the 1950 amendment to the Chandler Act eliminated the bona fide pur-
chaser test, see note 29 supra. But the Louisiana, Washington and Hawaii statutes, in
addition to containing the above provision, state that a creditor obtaining a judicial lien
perfected prior to the assignment will prevail. Other statutes, e.g., Texas, imply the same
rule, which might invite application of Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954),
reaffirmed in Conti v. Volper, 229 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1956), and followed in England v.
Sanderson, 236 F.2d 641, 643 (9th Cir. 1956). Constance, a bankruptcy case, tested the
validity of a mortgage perfected some time after execution under a New York statute
which stated that simple contract creditors extending credit during the gap could defeat
the mortgage, even after its perfection, by obtaining a judicial lien. While no such creditor
actually existed, Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 66 STAT. 430, 11 U.S.C. § 1.10(c) (1952), which
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-county or state ;a time of filing and perfection-before, simultaneously with
or within a certain time after assignment;39 effective duration of filing ;40
gives the trustee the avoiding powers of a hypothetical lien creditor under state law, was held
to invalidate the mortgage. Professor Moore has interpreted Constance to empower a
trustee to "set aside any transfer which any hypothetical judicial lien creditor could have
set aside in the past." MooRE, DEBTORS' AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 656 (1955). Should this
view of Constance prevail, assignments governed by the above statutes-because of the
vulnerability of receivables to garnishment prior to assignment-would be endangered.
However, Constance should enable reaching into the past only with respect to the extension
of credit-not with respect to the acquisition of the lien. Section 70(c) vests the trustee
with property upon which a hypothetical creditor could have obtained a judicial lien "at
the date of bankruptcy." Thus, unless assignments remain vulnerable to judicial liens
obtained at bankruptcy, Constance should be inapplicable. Other commentators endorse this
interpretation. 4 CoLL R, BANKRUPTCY ff 70.51 (Supp. 1956); Kleinberg & Masterson,
Constance v. Harvey-A Defense, 62 Com. L.J. 124 (1957) ; Marsh, Constance v. Harvey
-The 'Strong-Arm Clause' Re-Evaluated, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 65 (1955) ; Weintraub, Levin
& Beldock, The Strong-Arn Clause Strikes the Belated Chattel Mortgage, 25 FORDHAMT
L. REv. 261, 269 (1956).
Far from exposing the assignee to the dangers of Constance v. Harvey, some courts
place a garnishing creditor in no better position than the assignor by holding that the pur-
pose of the filing statute is to protect assignees of the same account. Oklahoma Oxygen
Co. v. Citizens State Bank & Trust Co., 274 P.2d 372 (Okla. 1954) (assignments of after-
acquired accounts not protected by filing statutes, yet good against attaching creditors).
But see Treadwell v. A. Kristoferson, Inc., 32 Wash. 2d 145, 200 P.2d 740 (1948).
38. See text at notes 150-70 infra.
39. All filing statutes except those listed below permit filing at any time before or
after an assignment and hold an assignment perfected when filed or when made, whichever
is later. For example, when A files before B files, but B obtains a prior assignment of the
same account, B prevails, except in so far as other provisions of these statutes, listed in notes
36, 37 supra, indicate a different result. In these states, an assignee, though he knows that
he filed first, must determine whether anyone filed after him before taking an assignment.
The California statute reqgtires recording before or within five days after the assign-
ment. As interpreted in Menick v. Carson, 96 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D. Cal. 1951), a late-
filed assignment is invalid as against a creditor who extended credit at any time before
filing and before collection of the account; such a creditor can recover proceeds already
collected by the assignee. By applying the rule of Constance v. Harvey, discussed in note
37 supra, a trustee could thus invalidate any late-filed assignment, even if no creditor had
actually extended credit before filing. See Marsh, supra note 37, at 71. Provisions similar
to the one in the California act are contained in the Washington and Hawaii statutes, ex-
cept that time limits for filing after assignment are ten and thirty days respectively. In
all three jurisdictions, the date of perfection presumably relates back to the date of assign-
ment if notice is filed within the prescribed period. The Ohio act demands recording prior
to or contemporaneously with the assignment. This statute, as well as the Washington
and Hawaii statutes, can be interpreted as holding all late-filed assignments completely
invalid as against third parties. The court in Menick v. Carson refused to attribute such
an intent to the California legislature.
Under the North Carolina statute, an assignment, whether executed before or after fil-
ing, becomes protected as of the time of filing, provided it is made within the effective
duration of the filed notice. South Carolina seems to follow the same rule.
40. In the following jurisdictions, filing is effective for one year: Ala., Ariz., Colo.,
Fla., Idaho, Kan., Mo., Neb., Okla., Utah, Vt., Hawaii; for two years: La.; for three
years: Cal., Iowa, Mich., Ohio, S.C., Tex., Wash.; for four years: Ga.; for five years:
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types of transactions and debts to which the statute applies ;41 whether notifica-
Mass., Pa., P.R. In North Carolina, filing is effective for the period stated in the filed
notice. Most of the above statutes have provisions for filing of renewal statements. Only
the Georgia, Iowa, Missouri and Texas acts contain no such clauses.
In Keeran v. Salley, 244 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), the court undermined the
Texas provision making a recorded notice of assignment valid for three years. The court
interipreted the statutory definition of an account receivable--"an existing or future right
to the payment of money due or to become due ... under an existing contract"-as pro-
tecting only those assigned accounts which had arisen under contracts existing at the time
of filing. The Texas statute was not intended to force an assignee to record each new
assignment when made, as is the rule for chattel mortgage recordation. Rather, the statute
was designed to permit general notice filing at relatively long intervals in the manner of
the UNIFORM TRUST REcEI Ts ACT § 13 (4). The real purpose of the definition upon which
the court based its decision was to require separate assignments of accounts as they arise
instead of separate recordings, and thus prevent the assignment of accounts to arise in the
future. See note 44 infra. See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Vial, 232 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1956). Texas changed its statute to foreclose reoccurrence of the Keeran result. But the
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Utah and Vermont stat-
utes all contain language similar to the former Texas definition, and general notice filing
in these states may therefore be impaired. While the Ohio statute also has such language,
other provisions are sufficiently clear to make a Keerant result unlikely.
41. The definitions of an assignment and of an account receivable vary considerably
among statutes. Typically, an assignment includes any transfer, sale, pledge or mortgage
of an account receivable, or of a part thereof. Transfers by operation of law are not in-
cluded in the Kansas, Texas and Hawaii definitions. Other statutes require the assignor
to be in a business or profession (Ala.), or to be either a wholesaler or one who renders
services for hire under a contract (Kan.). The California statute applies only to assign-
ments made in the regular course of business.
Accounts receivable are sometimes defined as rights to payment for goods sold, leased
or transferred, or for services rendered (Ohio, UNIFORM COMMER cIAL CODE § 9-106; Iowa
requires these transactions to have taken place in the regular course of business). Most
statutory definitions embrace only amounts due or to become due on open accounts or con-
tracts. As to whether a contract must exist at the time of assignment, see note 44 infra.
Filing and validation acts generally exclude one or more of the following categories from
the definition of accounts receivable and thus from the scope of the statute: (1) rights
represented by judgments, negotiable instruments, chattel mortgages, conditional sale con-
tracts or other instruments required to be recorded (e.g., Cal., see In re Richards, 108 F.
Supp. 259 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (bank's purchase of conditional sales contract with reservation
of a percentage of price as protection against default not within statute), Ohio, Cont.,
Minn., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-104(f), 9-106) ; (2) a nonnegotiable instrument
which so represents the obligation that an assignee in possession of the document has rights
superior to other claimants (Fla., see M. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923 (5th
Cir. 1955) (government warrant held capable of being pledged and therefore excluded from
the Florida recording requirement) ; Colo., Neb., Tex., Vt. and others have similar require-
ments) ; (3) wages (Ala., Ark., Conn., Iowa, Minn., Neb., N.H., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-104(d) ; Iowa excludes wages by statutory implication and decision, Peterson
v. Ball, 121 Iowa 544, 97 N.W. 79 (1903) (construing an almost identical earlier section) ;
while Maryland and North Dakota include wages by statute, and Colorado, whose statute
is silent on the point, includes them by decision, Ware v. Barr, 126 Colo. 311, 248 P.2d
1073 (1-952)) ; (4) sums due under construction contracts (Ala., Cal., Ga., Iowa, Neb.,
N.C.; Texas allows such assignments if the land is described in the notice which must be
filed in the county where the land is located) ; (5) amounts due from preharvest sale, by
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tion arrangements need be filed;2 and whether an assignment must be for
value.43 Several validation and filing statutes change the common-law rules on
grower, of farm crops (Neb.) ; (6) obligations evidenced by life insurance policies (Minn.,
N.H.) or any insurance policy (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-104(g)); (7) tort claims
and bank or savings deposits (UNIFOR.M COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-104(k)); (8) sums due
from the United States (Ala., Ga.).
Assignments of federal debts, of course, come under the Assignment of Claims Act of
1940, 54 STAT. 1029, as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1952), which provides that an assign-
ment within its terms shall constitute a "valid assignment for all purposes." Whether this
phrase enables an assignment perfected under the act to prevail as against another assign-
ment favored by state statute is unclear. Cases supporting both views exist. For exclusive-
ness of the federal statute, see General Cas. Co. v. Second Nat'l Bank, 178 F.2d 679 (5th
Cir. 1949) ; Coconut Grove Exchange Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 149 F.2d 73 (5th
Cir. 1945). Contra, Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 117 Ct. Cl. 736, 93 F. Supp.
891 (1950); Hardin County Say. Bank v. United States, 106 Ct. Cl. 577, 65 F.
Supp. 1017 (1946). Yet these cases involve competing claims of sureties on government
contractors' performance bonds and financing banks. And the exclusiveness issue is prob-
ably obscured by policy considerations transcending the Assignment of Claims Act. See
41 VA. L. REv. 984 (1955).
That the present Claims Act affects only rights against the government, not between
third parties, is suggested by interpretations of the pre-1940 act. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, c.
81, § 1, 10 STAT. 170. Although this statute declared assignments of government claims
"absolutely null and void," cases held that such assignments could be valid as between as-
signor, assignee and everyone else except the government; questions of validity and prior-
ity among assignees were then governed by state law. Martin v. National Surety Co., 300
U.S. 588 (1937) ; California Bank v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 129 F.2d
751 (9th Cir. 1942). And, in a case decided after the 1940 amendment, the Third Circuit
ruled that state law determined priority as between a trustee in bankruptcy and an assignee
of moneys to become due under a government contract. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190
F.2d 994, 997 (3d Cir. 1951). See also Note, 101 U. PA. L. Rv. 106, 121-22 (1.952) (state
law governs if the assignment does not comply with the act). Six state accounts receivable
statutes (Kan., N.C., Ohio, S.C., Tex., Vt.) exclude assignments which are subject to
special provisions of other state or federal acts. These exclusion provisions might be
read as encompassing the Claims Act as well as acts such as those governing assignments
of wages and assignments for the benefit of creditors.
42. The Missouri and North Carolina statutes recognize notification of the account
debtor as an alternative to filing. The Georgia statute states that filing is merely an addi-
tional method of giving notice and does not abolish other methods. Although Georgia
courts have never decided that the English rule obtains in the state, see note 26 supra, the
provision implies that notice to account debtors would constitute an effective substitute
for recordation.
43. Several statutes do not mention the need for giving of value. E.g., Me., Md., Mich.,
Va., S.C., S.D. Among the statutes requiring consideration, the majority makes transfers
for an antecedent obligation perfectible. Ala., Ariz., Colo., Conn., Fla., Idaho, Kan., Minn.,
Neb., N.H., N.C., Ohio, Utah, Vt., Hawaii, P.R., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201
(44) (1957 off. ed.), § 9-108(1) (1952 ed.). Others simply require a valuable considera-
tion, leaving unanswered the question whether an antecedent debt will qualify. Ill., Ind.,
La., Okla., Ore., Wash., Wis. Under common law, an assignment made to secure an
antecedent debt is generally held to have been made for value. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 438A (rev. ed. 1936).
States also differ on the manner of executing assignments: many statutes, e.g., Mich.,
Minn., Okla., Tex., Utah, require a written assignment to be "delivered" before it can
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after-acquired accounts.4 Moreover, most either abolish the rule of Benedict
become perfected. This rule contrasts with the provision of some statutes, e.g., La., per-
mitting an assignment to be completed by notation on the assignor's books. Under the
UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203(1) (b), the assignor must sign a security agreement.
44. The UNhi oRm COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(3) and the Iowa, Michigan and Texas
statutes give effect to assignments of accounts to arise in the future, even though "the
particular account is not contemplated" (Iowa), or the contract under which it is to
arise is "not then in existence" (Mich., Tex.). The Texas statute requires assign-
ments to describe present and future accounts with sufficient particularity to
identify them; the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110 requires reasonable identi-
fication. These statutes changed the common law on this point in Iowa, Massa-
chusetts and Texas. In re Estate of Nelson, 211 Iowa 168, 233 N.W. 115 (1930) ; Taylor
v. Barton Child Co., 228 Mass. 126, 117 N.E. 43 (1917); First Nat'l Bank v. Campbell.
193 S.W. 197 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). Prior to statutory enactment, Michigan common
law already recognized the validity of assignments of future book accounts. Union Trust
Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907). The Kansas statute may approve assignments
of after-acquired accounts. It defines an account as "an existing or future right to the
payment of money." The "future right" may be interpreted to refer to money not yet
due but to become due under an existing contract or obligation. Had this been the drafts-
man's intent, however, such traditional language as "an existing right to future payment"
would probably have been used. Whether Kansas common law allowed assignments of
accounts to arise in the future is uncertain. See Chatterton v. Clayton, 150 Kan. 525, 95
P.2d 340 (1939) (assignment of heir's expectancy good against garnishor) ; Schmidt v.
Plummer, 140 Kan. 436, 37 P.2d 1 (1934) (denying, as against creditors, effectiveness
of an after-acquired property clause in a chattel mortgage) ; Morris v. Nelson, 124 Kan.
127, 257 Pac. 729 (1927) (seeming to require a further act to insure assignment).
In any event, the implied statutory acceptance of Benedict v. Rather, see note 45 infra,
weakens the interpretation that assignments of after-acquired accounts are protected,
since the two doctrines are, in policy, incompatible. Cf. NEW YORII LAW REVISIoN COM-
MISSION, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLE NINE 154 (1955).
Eleven statutes limit protection to assignments of existing or future rights to pay-
ment under an existing contract. Colo., Fla., Idaho, Ill., N.C., Ohio, Okla., Utah, Vt.,
Wis., Hawaii. Four states achieve the same result by referring to rights under an un-
performed contract; the implication being that contracts must at least exist. Ariz., Cal.,
Ind., Wash. In H. S. Mann Corp. v. Moody, 144 Cal. App. 2d 310, 301 P.2d 28 (1956), the
court recognized this implication but viewed another reference in the California statute
to "accounts to arise in the future" as indicating legislative intent to continue common-law
protection of assignments of after-acquired accounts. The Connecticut and New Hamp-
shire statutes further restrict protection to assignments of sums to become due for goods
completed or services rendered under an existing contract. But see the New Hampshire
Factors' Lien Act, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 446:1-:10 (Supp. 1957), which has beei
interpreted to authorize assignments of accounts to arise in the future, even though the
accounts did not arise from liened inventory, provided notice was filed under the act.
Perkins v. Lakeport Nat'l Bank, 139 F. Supp. 998 (D.N.H. 1955). Eleven statutes
define accounts as sums due or to become due on open accounts or contracts. Ala., Ark.,
Ga., Me., Md., Minn., R.I., S.C., S.D., Va., P.R. Whether this type of statute refers
to both existing and future contracts is unclear. As in the California case cited above, a
court will undoubtedly be influenced by the common law in effect before enactment of
the statute. See Clanton Bank v. Robinson, 195 Ala. 194, 70 So. 270 (1915) (future
accounts not assignable); Baskin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 190 Ark. 448, 79 S.1jV.2d 724
(1935) (assignable); Ainsworth v. Mobile Fruit & Trading Co., 102 Ga. 123, 29 S.E.
142 (1897) (not assignable). In Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. A. M. Cameron Co., 210
F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1954) (applying Minnesota law), such accounts were held nonassignable,
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v. Ratner or modify its extreme applications to returned goods and price adjust-
ments.
45
Choice of law is thus likely to determine most cases testing multistate ac-
counts receivable financing transactions. Admittedly, conflicts problems are
but, in denying a rehearing, 212 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1954), the court implied that future
accounts might be assignable if the assignment properly identified accounts arising under
future sales.
The Nebraska statute, while defining an account as a right to payment under an exist-
ing contract, provides elsewhere that all items in an open or running account, even though
added subsequent to the assignment, shall be deemed included in the assignment. Thus,
future accounts with existing customers are assignable. Louisiana's statute, which also
refers to an open, running or book account, possibly permits the same interpretation.
No implication can be read into the Missouri or Oregon statutes; the common law will
thus stand. See Bissell v. Hill, 10 Mo. App. 593 (1880) (future debts assignable; semble).
The North Dakota bookmarking requirement makes assignments of after-acquired ac-
counts impossible. See also the New York and New Jersey factors' lien acts permitting
assignments of future accounts in notification arrangements. Note 30 supra.
Assignments of accounts to arise in the future, even when allowed by state law, may
well be voidable in bankruptcy to the extent that the accounts arose within four months
of bankruptcy. Trustees can claim that under Bankruptcy Act § 60, 64 STAT. 24
(1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1952), assignments of future accounts were made for ante-
cedent debts and are therefore invalid (if the other requirements of § 60 are met). The
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108 anticipates the argument by providing that the se-
cured party's interest in after-acquired collateral "shall be deemed taken for new value
and not as security for an antecedent debt." The effectiveness of this section is doubtful.
NEW YORK LAW REvIsIoN CoarMIssIo, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, ARTICLE
NINE 136-39, 172-73 (1955). Perhaps a successful means of avoiding § 60 invalidation would
be to assign existing accounts up to a certain total amount, and provide that as new accounts
arise they shall automatically be substituted for the oldest outstanding accounts so that
the assignee's lien will cover a constant total amount of receivables. The release of liens
on old accounts would thus serve as present consideration for the automatic acrrual of
liens on new accounts.
45. See text at notes 17-22 supra. Statutes in the following jurisdictions repudiate
Benedict v. Ratner by stating in effect that the assignee's lien shall not be affected be-
cause of permission given to the assignor freely to use proceeds as they are collected
without accounting for them: Ga., Mich., N.C., Ohio, S.C., Wash., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-205 (Pa., Mass.), Hawaii. A majority of statutes, however, provide only that
assignments shall be unaffected by the assignor's dealing with returned goods as his
own property or by his granting credits, allowances or adjustments to the account debtor.
Ala., Ariz., Cal., Colo., Conn., Fla., Idaho, Kan., Me., Minn., Mo., Neb., N.H. (but see
discussion of factors' lien acts infra), Tex., Utah, Vt., P.R. Accordingly, only the ex-
treme application of Benedict, see note 19 supra and accompanying text, is abolished in these
states, and, by implication, the remainder of the rule is legislatively sanctioned. See Malcolm,
supra note 17, pp. 36-37. The Arkansas statute makes an assignor trustee for the benefit of
the assignee "of all sums paid by the account debtor in good faith." By thus labeling the
rights and obligations of the parties, the statute may be construed as protecting their
relationship against Benedict's fraud-in-law doctrine. When not mentioned in statutes,
Benedict will probably persist where formerly applied. Mount v. Norfolk Say. & Loan Co.,
192 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1951) (applying Virginia law). But the exclusiveness of statutory
precepts has been urged as grounds for departing from Benedict precedent. Cf. Colbath
v. Mechanicks Nat'l Bank, 96 N.H. 110, 70 A.2d 603 (1950) (Benedict, although com-
mon law, held abolished as to inventory since Factors' Lien Act contains no express
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usually of minor significance when presented in suits brought by an assignee
against account debtors who have paid either the assignor or a subsequent
assignee, or who claim setoffs. For the near uniformity of state statutes
and decisions gearing account debtors' liability to actual notice of the plain-
tiff's assignment and preserving to them all defenses available against their
assignors at the time of notification relegates choice of law to the background
of such litigation.46 Similarly, disputes between assignor and assignee rarely
provision with regard to the rule); Second Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 189 F.2d 115, 11
(5th Cir. 1951) (suggesting that the Texas filing statute, by removing the vice of
secrecy, makes full adherence to Benedict less important).
Several statutes give the assignee a lien on returned goods; all of these except the
Illinois act attach qualifications. For example, in Minnesota the lien is given against all
but a bona fide purchaser of the goods, or, in North Carolina, a bona fide purchaser
or a "lienee" (sic). The Washington statute provides a lien if the goods are segregated,
and the South Carolina act affords a lien against general and judgment creditors of
the assignor. In the 1956 Recommendation of the Editorial Board, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code for the first time deals with the returned goods problem in receivables
financing. Subsections 9-306(5) (c), (d), give the assignee a security interest in the goods
against the assignor, but subordinate it to a security interest existing in the goods
before sale. To be good against creditors of the assignor, the assignee's lien must be
perfected, i.e., filed.
Only the North Carolina statute deals with accounts arising from resale of returned
goods; it gives the assignee an automatic lien on such receivables.
Several factors' lien acts affect Benedict's application to accounts receivable whenever
the filing requirement of that act is fulfilled. Thus the New Hampshire act, N.H. Rev.
STAT. ANN. § 446:7 (Supp. 1957), abolishes the rule entirely, even with respect to accounts
which arose from goods not subject to a factors' lien, while the Minnesota and Wisconsin
acts repudiate Benedict only with respect to accounts arising from liened merchandise,
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 514.89 (Supp. 1957); Wis. STAT. § 241.145(10) (1955). Nine acts
permit the assignor to exercise dominion over returned inventory and to make price
adjustments, irrespective of whether the goods from which the accounts arose were sub-
ject to a lien. ALA. CODE tit. 47, § 132(6) (Supp. 1955) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 82, § 108
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); IND. ANN. STAT. § 43-1205 (Supp. 1955); ME REv. STAT.
ANN". c. 181, § 8 (Supp. 1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 382-16 (1956); N.J. ST.AT. ANx.
§ 2A:44-183 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. PEes. PROP. LAW § 45; TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5506(c), § 6 (1956) (adjustment only) ; W.VA. CoDEANN. §3946(22) (Supp. 1957). Finally,
the Vermont act renounces the adjustments and returned goods rule for accounts which
arose from liened goods only. VT. STAT. § 2748 (1947).
46. Nearly all assignment of accounts receivable statutes provide that an account
debtor is discharged pro tanto when he deals in good faith with the assignor, creditors
of the assignor, a subsequent assignee or other successors in interest. Yet variations exist.
Some statutes mention only payment by the account debtor to the assignor (Ariz., Iowa,
Utah, UNIFORM CommmcImlAL CODE § 9-318(3)) or to the assignor or a subsequent assignee
('Md., Minn., Ore., R.I.). Others hold an account debtor liable only if he makes
such payment after receiving a notice in writing (Fla., Kan., La., Neb., Tex., Vt.) or
after receiving a copy of the notice actually filed with the secretary of state (Colo.).
Many statutes discharge an account debtor not only if he has made money payment in
good faith, but also if he has given a negotiable instrument, entered into a novation or
is subject to a final judgment on the debt (e.g., Ala., Conn., Ind., N.H.). Other statutes
which speak in terms of satisfying (e.g., Me.), discharging (e.g., Md.), or simply paying
(e.g., Mo.) the debt probably achieve the same result. But the Idaho and Utah statutes
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feature conflicts issues concerning the validity of assignments. 47 Applicable
mention only "money payment," apparently excluding the other means of satisfaction,
e.g., novation, as a defense by the account debtor against the assignee. Only four statutes
do not deal directly with payment made by the account debtor to someone other than the
assignee, but three of these (Ga., N.D., Okla.) provide that filing, or bookmarklng as
the case may be, shall not constitute notice to the account debtor, thus implying the
same rule as the other statutes. The Michigan statute perhaps arrives at the same result
by making any recipient of proceeds accountable to the protected assignee.
Statutory protection of good-faith account debtors who have paid once is consistent
with the generally accepted common-law rule. See Wolters Village Management Co.
v. Merchants and Planters Nat'l Bank, 223 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1955) ; First State Bank
v. Pure Van Pipe Line Co., 77 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1935) ; Patten v. Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 189, 6 S.E.2d 26 (1939). See also Koessler, supra note 3, at 63; Kupfer,
Accounts Receivable Financing: A Legal and Practical Look-See (Part 1), The
Practical Lawyer, Nov. 1956, pp. 50, 57, 59; NEw YoRx LAW REVISiON COMMISSION,
ASSIGNmENTS OF AcCOUNTS RECivABI.E 23 (1946).
The majority of statutes make an assignee's claims against an account debtor subject
to any defenses, setoffs or counterclaims which the account debtor had against the
assignor at the time of receiving notice of the assignment (e.g., Cal., Conn., Minn.).
Other states have enacted the same rule in statutes permitting assignees to sue in their
own name. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 539.1-.3 (Supp. 1957); MD. ANN. CODE art. 8,
§§ 1, 4 (Supp. 1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 8-94 (1957). And the common law accords with this
rule. Continental Purchasing Co. v. Van Raalte Co., 251 App. Div. 151, 295 N.Y. Supp.
867 (4th Dep't 1937) ; Ertel v. McCloskey, 167 Pa. Super. 120, 74 A.2d 652 (1950). A
few aberrational accounts receivable statutes exist. For example, the Colorado statute
allows the account debtor all defenses, counterclaims and setoffs arising before or after
notice of the assignment; the Utah statute permits no setoffs, etc., based on any claim
which the debtor acquired after the assignment (not notice of the assignment as in the
other statutes) ; Idaho has the same rule except that claims of breach of express or implied
warranty arising after the assignment are allowed; in Ohio, breach of warranty claims
discovered after notice to the account debtor may also be maintained; the Arkansas
statute preserves to the account debtor defenses against the assigned account, rather
than defenses against the assignor. Finally, the Micbigan and New Hampshire statutes
and the UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318(1) (a) afford the account debtor any rights
or defenses given by the contract from which the account arose.
State laws also differ on an account debtor's right to restrict assignability. In All-
husen v. Caristo Constr. Corp., 303 N.Y. 446, 103 N.E.2d 891 (1952), the New York
court held that an account debtor may effectively forbid an assignment of his obligation
by inserting a clause in the contract or purchase order to that effect. The Caristo
doctrine is followed in a large majority of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Caldwell,
126 Cal. App. 2d 548, 272 P.2d 934 (1954) ; Lewin and Sons, Inc. v. Herman, 143 Conn.
146, 120 A.2d 423 (1956); Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1251 (1954). Contra, UNIFORM COM-
[,RCIAL C,,ri § 9-318(4). An assignment, however, will always be good as between
assignor and assignee. Freitag v. The Strand, Inc., 205 F.2d 778 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1953).
And it has been held that the Caristo doctrine cannot be invoked by third parties. Tezel
& Cotter v. Roark, 301 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
47. Moreover, notification of account debtors has always been held irrelevant to the
validity of assignments as between the immediate parties. Koessler, supra note 3, at 63.
See R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1956), upholding an
unrecorded assignment against a tax lien on the ground that recording of an assignment
under the Texas statute would not affect validity between original parties, and that
56 STAT. 957 (1942), 26 U.S.C. § 3672a (1952), protects mortgagees, including assignees,
from a tax lien subsequently filed. Nevertheless, courts go both ways on whether § 3672a,
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state law is ordinarily stipulated by the parties.48 Irrespective of stipulation,
solvent assignors normally contest debts rather than assignments. 49 Claims
against insolvent assignors, on the other hand, generally involve bankruptcy
litigation where validity of assignments is most frequently challenged by an
assignor's trustee in bankruptcy. In these cases, as well as in nonbankruptcy
suits occasioned by attachment of assigned accounts or double assignments,
conflicts questions are commonly raised.50 Typically, an assignor's place of busi-
ness is situated in one state, the assignee's in another, and account debtors are in
several additional localities.51 Further complications may arise when the assign-
or resides in still another jurisdiction or has widespread branch offices, or when
the assignment is executed in a state having no other contact with the transaction.
The reference to many jurisdictions thus made possible combines with the
marked contrariety of their laws to make choice of law an often dispositive issue.
Despite the prominence of conflicts issues in accounts receivable transactions,
courts have failed to develop workable precepts to guide the business com-
munity. In choosing laws to govern multistate arrangements, they have utilized
conflicts doctrines developed in contract or chattel security decisions. 2 Although
which subordinates tax liens to any prior "mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
creditor," applies to assignments of accounts. Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Financing:
A Legal and Practical Look-See (Part 2), The Practical Lawyer, Dec. 1956, pp. 55, 59-60.
48. But stipulation of law is ineffective as against third parties. See, e.g., Maguire
v. Gorbaty Bros., 133 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1943) ; In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp.
562, 565 (E.D. Mo. 1943) ; Smith v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 311, 314, 273 P.2d 835, 836
(1954), discussed in note 163 infra.
49. If the solvent assignor is in fact indebted to the assignee, the validity of the
assignment is for most purposes irrelevant as between these parties. The assignee
is primarily interested in recovering his money. See Weiss v. Balaban, 315 Mass. 390,
53 N.E.2d 83 (1944) (absent specific agreement, assignee need not look only to assigned
accounts for satisfaction of assignor's debt but may sue assignor directly on debt before
collection of accounts; fact that assignments were partial and therefore not enforceable
at law immaterial since assignee sued on debt).
50. Double assignments, however, are relatively rare. Kupfer, Accounts Recei,-
able Financing: A Legal and Practical Look-See (Part 1), The Practical Lawyer,
Nov. 1956, pp. 50, 57; see NEw YORK LAW REVIsION COMMISSION, AsSIGNMENTS OF
ACCOUNTS REcEIv.arL 268 (1946). That the problem can nevertheless arise in com-
mercial accounts receivable lending is indicated by the case of State Factors Corp. v.
Sales Factors Corp., 257 App. Div. 101, 12 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1939). See also
note 108 infra.
51. "[I]t is far more frequent to find the account debtor, the assignor, and the assignee
to be domiciled in two or three separate states than to find all of them domiciled in one."
Kupfer & Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Company v. Klaudcr
Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32 VA. L. REv. 910, 915 (1946). See also
UNIFORM COMMECIA. CODE § 9-103, comment 2 (1952 ed.); Coblens, Assignments of
Accounts Receivable as Security-The Situation in Oregon, 29 ORE. L. REv. 214, 216
(1950).
52. See text at notes 58-97 infra. The absence of a uniformly accepted conflicts rule
in this area is underscored by numerous commentators. E.g., Koessler, supra note 3, at
47; Naw YORK LAW RE IsION COMMIssION, ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTS RECEiVABLE
261, 291 (1946). Illustrating the confusion in the English case of Republica de Guatemala
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such rules may adequately serve their own fields, they have limited value in
the accounts receivable area. Most traditional doctrines allow courts to select
relevant state law from among many contact jurisdictions. 53 Furthermore,
different rules are often applied to different aspects of a single receivables ar-
rangement.G4 The availability of several established conflicts rules, and the
wide choice of reference offered by most, precludes sound prediction of the
state whose law will ultimately govern a multistate transaction. Financers
and borrowers must therefore conform assignments to varying substantive
laws and comply with the filing requirements of many jurisdictions. The in-
creased expenditure and risk attending such difficulties most likely enhances
interest rates and impairs the free extension of business credit.
Erratic choice of law also frustrates conflicts principles. The primary objec-
tive of conflicts doctrine is uniformity of result-choice of law should not
vary with fortuitous choice of forum.5 5 Uniformity could, of course, be ac-
complished in the receivables area by universal application of any traditional
doctrine. But a conflicts rule is unlikely to gain universal acceptance unless
it complements the policy considerations of the substantive legal context in
which it operates.5 6 So viewed, ad hoc selection of law in accounts receivable
financing may be explained by the inadequacy of established doctrines to fulfill
commercial needs. 7 Because of the significance imported to conflicts issues by
v. Nufiez, [1927] 1 K.B. 669 (CA.), in which four judges proposed five different conflicts
rules for the assignment of a debt.
53. See text at notes 58-97 infra, pointing out that under the lex situs rule five differ-
unt jurisdictions may be chosen; that the place of performance may not be clearly located
in one jurisdiction; that the center of gravity doctrine involves value judgments on the
importance of different contact points and thus outcome will vary among courts; and,
finally, that even the place of assignment can not always be located with certainty.
54. According to the RESTATE IENT OF" CONFICTS (1934), for example, the assignability
of an account is governed by the law of the place in which that obligation was contracted
(§ 348). The law of the place of assignment tests the effect of an assignment as between
assignor and assignee, as well as the legal capacity of the assignor and the formalities
required to effectuate an assignment (§§ 350-52). The rights of an assignee against
an account debtor who has paid the assignor or a second assignee are determined by
the law of the place of performance of the assigned contract (§§ 353-54). See also Smith
v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 311, 273 P.2d 835 (1954) (formal validity of assignment
governed by law of place of assignment; necessity of notice, recording or possession
detcrmined by law of situs) ; 3 RA3EL, CONFICT OF LAws 401-16 (1950).
55. "It is frequently asserted, or assumed, that the dominant objective, indeed the
very raison d'etre, of Conflict of Laws is uniformity." Freund, Chief Justice Stone and
the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1210, 1211 (1946). See also NussaAuM, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw 21 (1943) (tracing uniformity concepts back to Savigny).
56. "[Uniformity] will be attained according to the measure of universality with
which conflicts rules commend themselves by their good sense to the judgment of courts
and legislators." Freund, supra note 55, at 1212. Cf. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law"; Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rides for Decision,
105 U. PA. L. Ryv. 797, 80S (1957), urging the same idea in advocating a federal conflicts
rule. See also text at notes 174-1 infra.
57. An additional explanation is judicial predilection for the laws of the forum
whenever plausible support is available. See note 70 infra. The existence of a multiplicity
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divergent state laws and the disruptive effect of unpredictable choice of law,
a rule should be sought which can subserve business requirements as well as
effectuate the objectives of conflicts doctrine.
TRADITIONAL DOCTRINES
Lex Situs
Finding precedent in chattel transfer cases58 and a tenuous analogy between
chattels and receivables, some courts apply lex situs to multistate assignments. 9
Due to their intangible nature, accounts receivable are variously situated at
five localities:60 the assignor's domicile or place of business,61 the locus of
of conflicts doctrines facilitates the exercise of this "homeward trend." NUSSBAUai,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1943).
58. See LALIvE, THE TRANSFER OF CHArELS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws 44-102
(1955); ZAPHIRiOu, TRANsI'mF OF CHATTELS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 39-49
(1956). The UNIFORm COmmECiAL CODE § 9-102 adopts the situs rule. While
lex situs has even been given a constitutional setting in chattel transfer cases, Warner
v. Jaffray, 96 N.Y. *248, 257 (1884), this notion is generally rejected.
59. For an example of this line of thought see Smith v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 311,
314-15, 273 P.2d 835, 836-37 (1954). Whether a debt can have situs has been questioned.
Proponents of rules other than lex situs base arguments against its applicability on a
seeming contradiction in terms in the expression "situs of an intangible." See, e.g., 39 HARv.
L. REV. 485 (1926). They maintain that situs is where a state has in rem jurisdiction and,
since there can only be in personam jurisdiction over an intangible, debts are incapable
of having a situs. But the dispute is sterile. Debts undoubtedly do have situs for certain
purposes, e.g., for taxation (domicile of creditor), for the administration of estates
(domicile of debtor or debtor's person), for insurance (same). Andrews, Situs of In-
tangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241, 255 (1939) ; Baker,
Administration of Intangibles, 19 Mo. L. Ray. 1, 9 (1954); 30 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 224,
225 (1956). Whether a debt should be considered as having situs for assignment purposes
is, therefore, the only meaningful inquiry.
60. In the case of an assignment of a tort debt, a sixth locality has been used-the
place where the tort suit was brought. Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 523 (1882).
61. In re Dalpay, 41 Minn. 532, 43 N.W. 564 (1889) (situs at assignor's domicile, in
forum state, though assignor's place of business elsewhere) ; In re Vardaman Shoe Co.,
52 F. Supp. 562, 565 (R.D. Mo. 1943) (dictum; assignor's place of business) ; Hanna v.
Lichtenhein, 182 App. Div. 94, 169 N.Y. Supp. 589 (1st Dep't 1918), rev'd on other grounds,
225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919) (dictum; court mentions both place of assignment
and lex situs, both at assignor's place of business) ; Flanagan, Assignments of Accounts
Receivable and the Conflict of Laws Under the Bankruptcy Act, 2 VAND L. REv. 409,
422 (1949) (using the maxim inobilia sequndtur personam--see note 173 infra-situs is
considered to be at the assignor's place of business) ; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 362
(8th ed. 1883) ; cf. Dix v. Bank of Cal. Nat'l Ass'n, 113 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Cal. 1952)
(assignor's domicile; rule used as alternative to place of assignment rule which leads to
same jurisdiction). For a listing of other advocates of this version of lex situs, see 3
RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 391-92 (1950). In Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson, 126 Cal.
43, 58 Pac. 320 (1899), the court, employing the maxim mobilia sequnutur personam,
found that situs was not in California (where the account debtor was garnisheed) but
then used the place of assignment rule to determine which foreign law applied.
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book accounts or bills receivable, 62 the account debtor's domicile or place of
business, 63 the place where the debt is garnisheed, 6 or the jurisdiction whose
law governs the assigned debt.65 Most often, situs has been established at the
place of garnishment or the account debtor's domicile. And few practical con-
siderations militated against use of the rule, for the cases generally concerned
assignments of personal debts or individual business accounts.
But associating account debtors with situs would be impracticable in large-
scale financing. Borrowers frequently assign debts of customers who are
located in several jurisdictions."0 Determining the validity of such arrange-
ments by referring to contrary state laws would obviously be an unfeasible task
for a bankruptcy tribunal. In nonbankruptcy litigation, ordinarily initiated by
garnishment, such administrative difficulties could be avoided by choosing the
law of the forum. Besides disrupting conflicts policy-results would vary
with the "accident" of jurisdiction-this version of lex situs would force lenders
to satisfy filing and other requirements in any state in which account debtors
were likely to be found. 67 Indeed, to safeguard the security of all assigned
accounts, compliance with forty-eight state laws would be necessary. Only
then could assignments be protected against the contingency of account debtors
62. Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510, 517 (6th Cir. 1907) (one of three
alternative rules, the others being the place where the assignment is to be performed and
the assignor's place of business; all three led to the same result).
63. Lewis v. Bush, 30 Minn. 244, 15 N.W. 113 (1883) (also stands for the proposition
that situs is where the debt is payable) ; Republica de Guatemala v, Nufiez, [1927] 1 K.B.
669, 697-98 (C.A.) (concurring opinion by Lawrence, L.J.; "quasi-situs" of debt in
England, though place of assignment, assignor and assignee located in Guatemala); In
re Maudslay, Sons & Field, [1900] 1 Ch. 602, 610; Jabbour v. Custodian of Absentee's
Property of State of Israel, [1954] 1 All E.R. 145 (Q.B. 1953) ; FALCONBRIDGE, CONFLICT
OF LAws 418 (1947). This is also the modern French doctrine. 3 RABEI., CONFLICT OF
LAws 392 (1950). Dicey once advocated the rule, DicEY, CONFLICT OF LAws 566 (3d
ed. 1922), but later abandoned it in favor of the proper law of the debt, DicEY, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 573 (6th ed. 1949).
64. Smead v. Chandler, 71 Ark. 505, 76 S.W. 1066 (1903); WESTLAKE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ .150-52 (7th ed. 1925) (the law of the forum for the recovery of
a debt; in case of an account debtor with branch offices, e.g., a bank, only at the branch
where the account payable is kept) ; ef. In re Queensland Mercantile & Agency Co., [1891]
1 Ch. 536, aff'd, [1892] 1 Ch. 219.
65. This version, usually labeled "proper law of the debt" rather than lex situs, is
advocated by many English and continental writers. Batiffol, Assignments, MIcH. Sum-
mER INsT. 48, 50 (1951); CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 450 (4th ed. 1952) ;
FoOTE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (5th ed. 1925); ScHNrrzER, HANDBUCH DES
INTERNAZIONALEN HAND LS-, WECHSEL- UNID CHECKRECHTS 218 (1938) ; WOLFF, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 548 (1945) (pointing out that German, Swiss and Scandinavian laws
follow this rule); cf. Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 285 Ill. 233, 120
N.E. 743 (1918); Lewis v. Bush, 30 Minn. 244, 1 5 N.W. 113 (1883); Runkle v. Smith,
89 N.J. Eq. 103, 103 Atl. 382 (Ch. 1918).
66. See Malcolm, Conflicts of Laws, Accounts Receivable, Mass. L.Q. Oct. 1945, pp.
38, 39, 41.
67. When account debtors are corporations operating several branches at which they
can be garnisheed, the unreasonableness of the burden becomes even more apparent.
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moving to uncovered jurisdictions. Locating situs at the jurisdiction whose
law governs the assigned debt would be equally undesirable for commercial
arrangements. A multiplicity of relevant jurisdictions would again make the
rule unworkable in bankruptcy and generally disruptive of business needs. S
Equating situs with the assignor's home office would afford a practicable
solution.69 General application of the law of the state in which the assignor
centers his business would produce uniformity of result irrespective of forum.
Predictability thus afforded, borrowers and lenders could safely conform assign-
ments to one set of filing and substantive laws. The interests of challenging
parties would also be served in that the existence and validity of these security
arrangements would be more readily ascertainable.
Nevertheless, the lex sitius doctrine should be abandoned in the receivables
field. Adherence to the label might induce some courts to depart from a home
office solution in favor of the rule's unserviceable alternatives-reassociation
of situs with account debtors. Commentators have often observed courts' pre-
dilections for the laws of their own jurisdiction.7 0 Since nonbankruptcy suits
involving assignments are usually initiated by garnishment of accounts, courts
could find justification for applying their own forum's laws in the plasticity
of the lex sitazs doctrine.71 Moreover, the usual reason advanced for accepting
lex situs is irrelevant to the context of accounts receivable financing. As applied
to chattel transfers, lex situs is justified as protecting unsecured creditors who
may have known of the chattels and looked to them for possible satisfaction
in the event of default.7 2 When an assignor conducts business in several states,
unsecured creditors might similarly rely on inventory located in a branch office.
But since every state fully protects buyers in the ordinary course of trade,7 3
68. Moreover, application of this rule would necessitate recourse to an additional
conflicts doctrine and thus further obstruct needed predictability. Deciding that a debt's
situs is located in the jurisdiction whose law governs the assigned debt, the court must
then apply the conflicts rule of contracts to the original transaction between the assignor
and the account debtor. Another element of uncertainty is thus introduced by the availa-
bility of several divergent conflicts doctrines in the contracts field. See discussion of these
doctrines as applied to assignments in text at notes 74-97 infra.
69. See text beginning at note 9S infra, advocating a lex loci comimerciendi rule.
70. "[T]he natural predilection of the judge for the lex fori... is, in all countries, the
most important single factor in the shaping of conflicts rules in practice." Kahn-Freund,
The Proper Law of a Contract and Affreightment, 17 MODERN L. REV. 255 (1954). See
also NUSSBAUM, PRIvATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 37 (1943); Goodrich, Two States and
Real Estate, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1941); cf. also HARPER & TAiNTOR, CoNFLicr oF
LAWS 175 (1937).
71. " 'Situs' seems to be one of those words by which nothing can be really explained,
but everything justified." Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing
of Accounts Receivable, 44 MicH. L. REv. 563, 610 n.199 (1946).
72. LALivE, op. cit. supra note 58, at 51. Story supported the rule with principles of
territoriality: "[T]he laws of every state affect and bind directly all property, whether
real or personal, within its territory .... " STORY, Coricr oF LAws § 18 (8th ed.
1883).




such reliance must cease, as a practical matter, when the inventory is sold.
More significantly, proceeds of particular sales--cash and accounts receivable
-are easily dissipated and thus are not realistically subject to the expectations
of unsecured creditors. Rather, once inventory leaves the debtor's premises,
general creditors can only rely on honesty and the continued solvency of the
going business.
Place of Assignment
The place of assignment, most frequently consulted for applicable law in
accounts receivable financing,74 is also an unsuitable conflicts reference. Choos-
ing the law of the place where an assignment is executed is an extension of the
lex loci contractus rule used in ordinary contract situations.75 As applied to multi-
state accounts receivable arrangements, the rule affords some predictability
and uniformity of result.76 Yet, while a place of assignment doctrine disarms
74. See, e.g., In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997, 999 (3d Cir. 1946) (although the court
mentions other contact points, it clearly indicates that the place of assignment is
the determinative rule). The place of assignment rule is thought by many to be
the generally accepted conflicts rule in the field. See, e.g., L. Hand, J., in New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F.2d 665, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1939); NEW YoRx LAW
REVISIoN CoMMISSION, ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE 283 (1946). Many commen-
tators support the rule. 2 BE.LE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 348-54 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT
or LAWS § 110, at 321-23 (3d ed. 1949) ; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1901) ; RE-
STATEMENT, CONFLICTS §§ 350, 352 (1934). The Restatement's influence can be seen in
the fact that courts sometimes cite it without any other authority. See, e.g., Barbin v.
Moore, 159 Ad. 409 (N.H. 1932). But see notes 52 supra, 173 infra. Yet the rule is
criticized as referring to the least important of all points of contact and as substituting
fortuity for reason. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 552 (1945).
75. RESTATENT, CoNFLICTS § 332 (1934).
76. While the place of assignment rule gives the greatest predictability among the
traditional doctrines, uncertainty is not eliminated. For example, the borrower may execute
an underlying agreement in Michigan, assigning all his accounts, present and future, to the
lender. Returning to his home state, the assignor would send weekly schedules of new
accounts to the assignee. A court may reason either (1) that Michigan law governs be-
cause it holds assignments of future accounts valid, and all accounts to arise in the
future were assigned there; or (2) that the law of the assignor's home state is applicable
since each account could be assigned only as it came into existence in that state-that
law not recognizing assignments of after-acquired accounts. In sum, a problem of "character-
ization" (or "qualification") is presented: definition of the "making of an assignment."
Some courts will look to the substantive law of one of the assignment states in order
to resolve this problem as a "preliminary question," while others may obviate character-
ization by restating the conflicts rule in a way that clearly identifies the place where
the assignment was made. For discussions of varying approaches to the problem of
characterization, see, e.g., NussBAUx, PIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-90 (1943) ; RoB-
ERTsoN, CHARAcTERZATION IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940).
Another area of possible uncertainty may be illustrated by In re Eby, 39 F2d 76 (E.D.
N.C. 1929). The assignor signed the contract of assignment in North Carolina and sent it,
along with the schedules of assigned accounts, to the assignee in Maryland. The court
held that since the contract was not effective until accepted by the assignee in Maryland,
the place of assignment was in Maryland. See also McKibbin v. Ellingson, 59 Minn. 205,
59 N.W. 1003 (1894), where an assignment was made in Minnesota to a Minnesota assignee
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forum shopping at the litigation stage, it may encourage parties to seek lenient
jurisdictions upon transacting assignments. Choice of law depends on an event
-signing a paper, mailing a schedule of accounts-which may be effected in
a state having no other contact with the transaction. Accordingly, the record-
ing statutes and substantive restrictions of contact states can be avoided at the
option of the parties.77
Moreover, a "mailbox" determination of applicable law cannot be cognizant
of successive assignments executed in different jurisdictions following different
laws. For example, a borrower might assign the same set of receivables in two
different states, first to A, then to B who notifies account debtors. A's state
may protect his claim against B, while under the law of B's state, B would
prevail by virtue of prior notification. Conflicting standards of priority thus
make the place of assignment an unfeasible rule for litigation precipitated by
double assignments.715 More important, the rule is equally ill-adapted to con-
tests between creditors of the assignor and a single financer. Initial assignments
by an assignor who did business in North Dakota. That the assignment was filed in North
Dakota (under an assignment for benefit of creditors statute) induced the court to con-
sider recordation as the final act of assignment and thus hold North Dakota law controlling.
For the difficulties which may arise in connection with ascertaining the lex loci con-
tractus, see COOK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS c. 14 (1942);
2 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWs 452-62 (1947).
77. See NEw YORK LAW RvISIOiN COmMISsION, ASSIGNMXENTS OF ACCOUNTs RE-
CEIVABLE 283 (1946), testimony of Milton Kupfer, pointing out the possibility of evading
New York law, if found burdensome, by establishing Connecticut branches for clearing
assignments. Accord, id. at 259. See also Flanagan, supra note 61, at 421. While Mr.
Kupfer's testimony was given in opposition to a proposal to enact a filing statute in New
York, it well illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of a place of assignment rule. Indeed,
a court in a jurisdiction which disallows assignments of after-acquired accounts, note
23 supra, and which follows the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, note 17 supra, is not likely to
validate assignments made in a state which has neither restriction, particularly when the-
assignor transacted all his business in the forum state.
78. The Restatement recognizes this problem and therefore provides a different rule
for double assignments-the law of the place of performance of an assigned contract.
RESTATEmENT, CONFLCTS § 354 (1934). Accord, STUMBE G, CONFLICT OF LAwS 262
(1951). The Restatement section in fact refers to suits by an assignee against an account
debtor who has paid a second assignee. Yet it has been generally interpreted to refer to
suits between competing assignees as well. See, e.g., referee's opinion cited in In re
Rosen, 157 F.,d 997, 999 n.7 (3d Cir. 1946) ; two unreported cases, the Hebeler and Nizolck
cases, cited by Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Ac-
counts Receivable, 44 MICH. L. REv. 563, 608-09 (1946). According to his treatise, how-
ever, Professor Beale (author of the Restatement) would have the law of the place of
assignment govern whenever both assignments are made in the same jurisdiction or in
different jurisdictions having the same law. When assignments are made in jurisdictions
with different laws, the assignee who first protected himself against subsequent assignees un-
der the laws of the state where his assignment was made, prevails. 2 BrEAL, CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 354.1 (1935). Accordingly, A would have the superior claim in the text example
above. For criticism of the cases used by Professor Beale to support his view, see Flanagan,
supra note 61, at 417. Professor Beale's rule has the disadvantage of requiring reference to
separate state laws, including, presumably, laws concerning after-acquired accounts and
retained dominion-Benedict v. Ratner. See notes 17-24 supra. Moreover, under this rule,
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in accounts receivable arrangements are typically executed in conjunction
with the basic continuing credit contracts at the financer's place of business.
All subsequent assignments of accounts are usually effected at the home office
or various branch offices of the assignor. Piecemeal testing of the arrange-
ment by two or several divergent state laws would be a cumbersome and
irrational method to resolve conflicting rights in what is functionally a single
course of dealing.79
Place of Performance
Another traditional contracts rule-place of performance-has been sug-
gested by courts for determination of accounts receivable conflicts issues.80
Place of performance is variously used in contract cases. 8' Under one variation,
usually employed in connection with lex loci contractus, each aspect of per-
formance is governed by the law of the place in which it occurred. Another
method of applying the rule with lex loci contractus results in testing all aspects
of performance by the laws of the place in which contractual obligations were
principally fulfilled. Occasionally, the principal place of performance is con-
sulted for all issues-execution as well as performance-arising out of the
transaction. An aspect approach may prove serviceable in ordinary contract
suits where parties dispute isolated parts of each other's performance. But
since the major litigation engendered by accounts receivable financing concerns
the validity of entire assignments,8 2 the rule, if extended to the receivables
field, need be used as a principal place of performance doctrine. Extension of
credit and assignment of accounts constitute the essential performances in an
accounts receivable transaction. If judicial inquiry were thus limited, the assign-
neither assignee would have any practical way of investigating the possibility of another
assignment.
The Restatement provision, as interpreted by the cases cited above, at least makes such
prediction possible. For the place of performance of the assigned debt may be more readily
cognizable under one of the standard contract rules of conflicts. Should applicable law
then demand filing or notification of account debtors, an assignee might ascertain prior
assignments. If neither filing nor notification is required, the assignee knows that he
cannot rely on the absence of superior claims. Yet the Restatement rule which is similar
to the "proper law of the debt" doctrine, see notes 65, 68 supra, contains the same disa-
bilities. And adherence to a uniform conflicts rule applicable to all possible cases in ad-
dition to double assignments is preferable. See text beginning at note 98 infra.
79. For a discussion of the branch office problem, see text at notes 108-11 infra.
80. Courts refer either to the place of performance of the assigned contract, see note
84 infra, or the place of performance of the assignment arrangements, see, e.g.,
Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907).
81. For discussions of place of performance doctrine in contracts, see, e.g., NusSBAUM,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-75 (1943); 2 RABEL, CoNFLICr OF LAws 463-69
(1948).
82. This is the case in bankruptcy litigation. See, e.g., Lee v. State Bank & Trust Co.,
38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930), decree modified, 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Mount v. Norfolk
Say. & Loan Corp., 192 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1951). The validity of assignments of
individual accounts is usually challenged by unsecured creditors in garnishment cases. See,
e.g., Smith v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 311, 273 P.2d 835 (1954).
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ment would probably be considered a more significant feature than the loan,
and the rule would consequently resolve into the unworkable place of assig-n-
ment doctrine.8 3 However, courts suggesting the relevancy of the performance
location seem to situate it at the place where proceeds of assigned accounts
are collected.8
4
Gearing the performance rule to the place of collection might furnish some
predictability in the nonnotification field. Nonnotification agreements require
the assignor to collect accounts and remit proceeds to the assignee.8 5 Should
performance be associated with collection, the principal place of performance
would probably be considered the assignor's home office. Remission, however,
could easily be construed as a more important component of the collection
process. And if the assignee's bank-the place of remittance-is not located
in the assignor's state, the law of another jurisdiction would Be introduced.
Such precedent, once settled, could be harmful when nonnotification agree-
ments permit an assignor to place collected proceeds in different banks located
near multistate branch offices.
Even if an actual collection-performance equation were established in non-
notification cases, its application to notification transactions would remain
problematical. In notification arrangements, assignees receive payment from
account debtors.88 Courts wishing to follow the rule in such cases would have
to decide whether an assignee's collection is performance under the terms of
the governing contract. Assumption of this burdensome and sometimes ex-
pensive process may be considered by the assignor as bargained-for consid-
eration reflected in the purchase price of accounts. But since the assignee in
nonrecourse notification assignments bears all risks of noncollection,8 7 failure
of collection entails no loss to the assignor. So viewed, an assignee's collection
would not constitute contractual performance; and a collection version of the
performance doctrine would be inapplicable to notification financing. Conse-
quently, even limiting performance to the mechanics of collection does not avoid
unwanted speculation.
Broadening the scope of the rule to embrace all phases of performance
could only be justified on flexibility grounds. Mechanical conflicts doctrines are
often criticized as preventing adaptation of relevant law to heterogeneous trans-
actions. However, if flexibility is desired, judicial inquiry need not be confined
83. See notes 74-79 supra and accompanying text. If the loan were considered more
significant, the rule would resolve into the assignee's place of business, which has never
been suggested as a governing doctrine, see text following note 183 inra, the assignor's
place of business, discussed infra in text beginning at note 97, or, again, into the place
of assignment.
84. Actually, place of collection is often synonymous with the place of performance
of the assigned debt, used by the RESTATEJmENT, Cox ircrs §§ 353, 354 (1934), in suits
between assignees and account debtors. See note 78 supra. It also comes very close to
the "proper law of the debt" rule. See note 65 supra.
85. See notes 5-12 supra and accompanying text.
86. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
87. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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to the contractual performance. Rather, applicable law can best be geared
to specific arrangements by examining all transactional events under a center
of gravity approach.
Center of Gravity
The center of gravity rule 88 selects the law of the state with which the trans-
action had most substantial connections.89 During the past twenty years, center
of gravity has received growing judicial recognition in contract cases. 0 Similar-
ly, several decisions in the receivables field, though not explicitly referring
to the rule, have employed its principles.91 Center of gravity is a theory of
conflicts based on notions of territoriality and appropriateness, which excludes
a rigid choice of law dependent on some arbitrarily selected feature of the
contract. 2 Implementation of the rule accordingly entails evaluating the rela-
tive significance of all events or "contacts" generated by a given transaction
and permitting the greatest accumulation of important connections to determine
applicable law.93 Certainty is, of course, foregone when contact points seem
evenly distributed between two or more jurisdictions. And abuse of the rule's
flexibility may be induced by customary judicial predilections for the laws
of the local forum. 94 Thus, center of gravity reflects a balancing process be-
tween diminished predictability and the risk of jurisdictional accidents on the
one hand, and recognition that diverse situations require flexible standards on
the other.
But balancing these interests in the context of a;counts receivable financing
demonstrates, instead, the need for a mechanical doctrine. Divergent state laws
and pronounced requirements for the free extension of business credit make
88. Center of gravity has also been termed "accumulation of contact points," HARPER
& TAINTOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 173 (1937), "proper law," Ehrenzweig, Interstate and
International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 MHINN. L. REv. 717, 722 (1957),
and "grouping of contacts," Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102
(1954).
89. See, e.g., HARPER & TAINTOR, CONFLICt oF LAws 173-75 (1937).
90. See, e.g., Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945) ; Auten v.
Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954) ; Ehrenzweig, supra note 88, at 722.
91. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907) (discussing
intention of parties, place of performance, assignor's place of business, etc.) ; In, re Rosen,
157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946).
92. Territoriality embraces the notion that the laws of a state have an interest, so
to speak, in a transaction when an event connected therewith occurred or is to occur in
that state, or when a person or thing involved in the transaction is located in that state.
HARPER & TArNToR, CoNuLicr oF LAws 173-75 (1937). "[T]his grouping of contacts
theory may, perhaps afford less certainty and predictability than the rigid general rules
." Fuld, J., in Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 161, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954).
93. "The 'contacts' that are weighed and counted are not chosen from a particular
list, nor do they represent actual contacts between the parties, but they are simply all
the major and minor points picked, arranged and evaluated by the court as relevant to
a decision of the conflicts question." Note, 40 CORNEr. L.Q. 772, 777-78 (1955).
94. See note 70 supra.
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predictability a more critical consideration in the receivables area.95 Possibili-
ties of multijurisdictional litigation also portend a greater risk of results vary-
ing with fortuitous choice of forum than in ordinary contract cases. Moreover,
while contract cases feature diverse situations, 96 receivables transactions fol-
low relatively stable factual patterns. If then, one contact in the arrangement
significantly and generally outweighs other transactional events, it could form
the basis of a rule which would not only complement center of gravity principles
but also obviate the attendant disabilities. The assignor's place of business,
which emerges as a predominant contact in virtually all assignment transactions,
suggests such a rule-lex loci commerciendi.97
LEX Loci COMMERCIENDI
The conflicting interests which give rise to most accounts receivable litigation
should measure the significance of contact points and thus indicate proper
choice of law. Assignees' security interests in accounts receivable are most
often contested by assignors' general creditors, either individually or repre-
sented collectively by a trustee in bankruptcy. Underlying each suit are the
discordant class interests of both parties. Unsecured creditors demand strict
safeguards against secret liens and preferential or fraudulent transfers.9
Assignees, on the other hand, to promote safe financing, require security
which is easily obtainable and obviously valid. 99 Disparities in state treatment
of assignment transactions primarily derive from differing attitudes on the
proper balancing of these Tconflicting interests. The contact point at which
both generic interests are most likely to be personified by the particular liti-
gants should be considered predominant and therefore determine the state
whose law should resolve the conflict.
95. See text at notes 30-45 supra; note 15 supra.
96. "The transactions of the business world are so numerous and of such a variety
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a general rule that should control in all
cases ... ." Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N.Y. 314, 322, 44 N.E. 959, 961 (1896).
97. The term, only recently coined, see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567, 577 (1957), is not
used without hestitation. But impalatable as a new Latin phrase may be, it seens justified
as a shorthand expression for "the law of the assignor's principal place of business." More-
over, 'the universal acceptance of the traditional term lex loci contractus facilitates under-
standing of lex loci cozinerciendi. Admittedly, the expression is not entirely accurate
in that it refers only to the place of doing business, not the principal place of doing business.
But insertion of an adjective or adverb would make the term unwieldly and frustrate
the purpose of its use.
98. See Koessler, Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF. L. Rnv. 40, 60 n.59
(1945). In Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 441 (1943),
the Court implied that nonnotification financing, permitting secret liens, prejudices un-
secured creditors.
99. Businessmen wish to avoid not only losing law suits but litigation itself, for the
costs of a suit, though won, can easily wipe out the profit margin of a given transaction. "Im-
precise standards encourage litigation and may lead commercial lending institutions to take
unnecessary precautions; each of these consequences will increase the cost of loans."
Note, 66 YAiL L.J. 257, 265 (1956).
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Accordingly, the law of the state in which the assignor conducts his business
should govern accounts receivable financing. While the assignee may not
operate his business in this state, his interest-facilitation of credit-is synony-
mous with that of his borrower in the context of bankruptcy or garnishment
litigation. The assignor's desire to obtain credit must, of necessity, coincide
with the assignee's need to acquire security interests upon which credit can be
safely extended. Thus, the assignee's interest is represented by the assignor
in the latter's jurisdiction. Concurrently, unsecured creditors tend to be clustered
near the assignor's place of business,' 00 and this state, more than any other,
is likely to have a direct concern in their protection.10 1 Admittedly, a balancing
of interests rationale does not invariably lead to the assignor's place of business
in such rare actions as those between two assignees of the same accounts or the
immediate contracting parties. 10 2 Nevertheless, the assignor's place of busi-
ness not only represents an essential contact point in most of these contests, 10 3
it constitutes the only rule which can practicably solve the conflicts problems
they occasion.10 4 Furthermore, application of other rules in minor actions
would frustrate uniformity and predictability objectives. While assignees could
insure validity against garnishing creditors by satisfying the laws of the assign-
or's jurisdiction, effectiveness against assignors and second assignees could
only be attained by conforming assignments to multiple state laws. More im-
portant, a more perfect representation of interests in some infrequent actions
should not justify departure from a general rule which embodies the fairest
100. Flanagan, supra note 61, at 424; see Note, 66 YALE L.J. 567, 579 (1957).
101. See Flanagan, supra note 61, at 422, arguing that the assignor's state of business
is the jurisdiction most interested in enforcing its public policy on recording (prevention
of fraudulent transfers) and assignments of future accounts (protection of the assignor's
solvency).
102. See notes 47, 50 supra.
103. "The only suitable contact of accounts receivable is with the business place where
the books are conducted." 3 RABEL, CO NFLICr OF LAws 432 (1950). On the importance
of the place where the books are kept in contrast to the principal place of business, see
notes 127-33 infra and accompanying text.
104. In opposing the rule of the assignor's residence or place of business, Cheshire
argues that it may lead to absurd results. He posits the hypothetical of an English resi-
dent assigning a debt governed by French law and owed by a German, to an Italian
resident in Italy, and then again to a Swiss resident in Switzerland. The assignee, claims
Cheshire, cannot reasonably expect to be subjected to English law. CHFSHIRE, PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAw 44S (4th ed. 1952). The point may be admitted, but, given the
confusion in this field, an assignee cannot afford to rely on any one law. Legally advised,
he will comply with the laws of all jurisdictions made relevant by existing doctrines
-including the law of the assignor's residence. Hence, the real problem is to
simplify compliance by achieving uniformity of conflicts rules. See note 56 supra. While
the reasoning in favor of lex loci commerciendi applies to commercial as well as non-
commercial situations (in which case it becomes the le.x domicllii), the arguments are,
of course, stronger in the interstate receivables financing context. For any rule requiring
application of many separate laws places unjustifiable burdens on financers. See text at
notes 58-97 supra. Perhaps a separation of interstate and international conflicts rules
is indicated. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 88. In practice, such a separation seems to
exist. Mueller, Book Review, 45 CAI.nF. L. REv. 394, 396 (1957) (critical).
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balance in the bulk of cases and provides the only workable solution in all
classes of litigation.
Lex loci commerciendi, moreover, is not inconsistent with recordation ob-
jectives. 10 5 Trade creditors seldom examine public records; larger unsecured
creditors and second assignees probably rely on their own evaluation of the
assignor's honesty and prospective sales volume."06 To the extent recordation
is necessary to give general creditors and other assignees an opportunity to
check, filing need be required only where interested parties can be expected
to look-at the assignor's place of business. 07 Selecting, under le.r loci com-
merciendi, the law of a state with no recording requirements would not preju-
dice creditors who have no way of knowing, or are uninterested in ascertaining,
whether the records of limitless other contact jurisdictions contain notice of an
assignment. Indeed, requiring assignees to comply with recordation statutes
outside of an assignor's state would obstruct liquid accommodation without
affording correlative protection.
105. Opinions differ as to the real purpose of filing. It is argued that its chief utility,
with the possible exception of real estate, is not to prevent deception of creditors at the
time they extend credit but to prevent the assertion of fraudulent and preferential security
interests after the debtor is insolvent. Koessler, Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 33
CALIF. L. REv. 40, 41 (1945) (foreword by Professor Hanna); cf. NEw Yopan LAw
REVISION COmmISSiON, ASSIGNMENTS OF Accou Ts REcEIVABLE 300 (1946). But see
testimony of representative of unsecured creditors arguing that filing of assignments, like
recordation of chattel mortgages, is desirable to prevent extension of unsecured credit
upon the strength of the apparent ownership of receivables, id. at 258-59. Accord, 'Menick
v. Carson, 96 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (purpose of statute is to prevent secret liens
and transfers which deceive a creditor who extends or continues credit on the basis of the
debtor's financial position) ; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-103, comment 2 (1952 ed.)
(purpose of filing is to allow subsequent creditors of the assignor to determine the true
status of his affairs). Prevention of preferences by general notice filing is limited to
cases where no filing existed before the preferential transfer was attempted. Where a
notice is filed by the assignee before the four-month period, any chose in action
not included in the financing arrangement may nevertheless be assigned and back-dated,
unless, perhaps, the filing statute requires a description of assigned accounts. E.g., MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 521.02 (Supp. 1956).
106. Recordation, in practice, is of little help to potential creditors dealing with the
assignor. See NEw YORK LAw REVSiON COMMIssION, ASSIGx.MfENTS OF ACCOUNTS RE-
cEIVABLE 6 (1946). At the hearing of the Commission, witnesses differed on this question,
one asserting that the only way for a potential creditor to find out the assignor's real
situation is to ask for a balance sheet, id. at 265, while another believed recording would
lower interest rates by making lending less hazardous, id. at 270. See also Hanna,
The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 617, 634 (1931).
107. In Smith v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 311, 316, 273 P.2d 835, 837 (1954),
the court stated that not requiring the assignee to record in the account debtor's state
"is not unreasonably inconsiderate of prospective creditors, for in the normal course of
commercial transactions, the logical place in which to ascertain credit responsibility is
at the place of business or residence of the assignor. The credit potential of a Texan
will be reflected more accurately and expeditiously by examining the records of his busi-
ness or home county in Texas than by laboriously looking to the residences of various
and scattered account debtors, one of whom is in California."
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Multistate Branch Office Problem
No deviation from lex loci commerciendi is indicated when the assignor
operates branch offices in several states-the law of his principal place of
business should apply. Admittedly, a representation of interests approach
might only sporadically select the law of the home office state, since unsecured
creditors of multistate businesses are likely to be grouped near branch offices.
A branch operation, however, is precisely the situation in which impracticality
outweighs the fairness to parties derived from choosing the state with an
integral concern-through representation-in the interests litigated. Each
creditor's claim against an assignment would have to be tested by the laws of
the state containing the branch office with which he dealt. When, for example,
branch A creditors garnishee accounts which arose in that state, application of
state A's law might seem a fair selection. But a more difficult case is posed
when a branch B creditor garnishees branch A accounts in state A. Holding
either that this creditor deserves state A law protection or carries state B law
into the litigation would fail to subserve the purpose of dividing applicable law
according to branch office states. Nevertheless, while neither result is rational,
one is necessary. And such a rule would be as likely to occasion uncertainty
as the traditional doctrines.
A branch office division of applicable law would be particularly undesirable
in bankruptcy litigation. 0 s Since bankruptcy courts must determine the validity
of assignments as against all general creditors, interpretation of the laws of
every state containing a branch would be required. Even if such extensive
adjudication were feasible, no logical method appears of apportioning accounts
or their proceeds to the claims of prevailing creditors. One procedure implied
by several state statutes would be to test the assignment of each account by
the laws of the branch state in which it arose.'0 9 Yet the policy underscoring
application of separate laws presupposes a balance between the conflicting inter-
ests of general creditors and assignees in the state in which such creditors
traded with the assignor. If no unsecured credit were extended to the assignor
at a branch, the law of its state would be properly inapplicable even though
accounts there came into existence. The greater the divergency in each state
between the proportion of unsecured credit and the percentage of arising ac-
counts, the less purposeful such a branch state division of applicable law becomes.
And since the largest share of unsecured credit is likely to be advanced at manu-
facturing branches where fewest accounts arise, parcelling the validity of
accounts according to the state of their inception is an undesirable approach." 0
108. Conflicts problems in this field most frequently arise in bankruptcy litigation.
Malcolm, Conflicts of Laws, Accounts Receivable, Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1945, pp. 38, 41.
109. See discussion of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Ohio statute, notes
154-60 infra and accompanying text. Of ourse, ledgers may be kept at the head office or at
regional branch offices rather than the local outlet. Several other statutes seem to require
recording whenever a branch office is located in the state. See notes 165, 168-70 infra and
accompanying text.
110. For example, assume assignor has manufacturing branches in states A, B and C,
and sales branches at X, Y and Z. Accounts receivable arise, of course, mainly in these
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Alternatively, assigned accounts might be prorated in proportion to unsecured
credit extended at each branch. Apart from the difficult task of determining
the size of an operation requisite to branch status, courts employing this pro-
cedure would confront the problem of ascertaining the branch with which each
creditor traded directly. Mfore generally, any division of applicable law would
place considerable burdens on secured parties. Financing arrangements, initi-
ally safe, would be jeopardized by the establishment of new state outlets. Absent
immediate filing and conformation to substantive requirements, assignments
could be avoided in bankruptcy by all creditors dealing with the new branch.'"
In addition to providing the only serviceable rule, le.x loci coninerciendi
complements state substantive law designed to protect general creditors. The
deficiencies inherent in other doctrines principally derive from their reference
to a multiplicity of jurisdictions. 11 2 Free from the multiplicity defect, lex loci
commerciendi denotes the state best suited to the protection of unsecured
creditors. Restrictions placed on security transfers are typically aimed at safe-
guarding creditors against Benedict v. Ratner violations and inducements to
rely on ostensible business health. Even were branch office records fully acces-
sible, creditors could not safely rely on the accounts or apparent prosperity
of a branch operation. Any justifiable reliance on a company's ability
, 
to meet
obligations must be induced, if at all, at the home office. 113
Similarly, Benedict precepts contemplate the principal place of business.
Three interpretations of Benedict's equivocal rationale prevail. Some courts
explain the decision as founded on the conceptual incompatibility of an absolute
transfer with unfettered dominion by the transferor." 4 If, in fact, Benedict
rests on mere conceptualism, it has no design to protect any party." 5 Com-
mentators, on the other hand, suggest that Benedict prevents fraudulent back-
latter states, 50% at X, 30% at Y and 10% at Z, with the remaining 10% distributed
among A, B and C. Unsecured creditors (suppliers, repairmen, employees), on the
other hand, extend credit principally at the manufacturing branches, 40% at A, 30% at B,
20% at C, with 10% at X, Y and Z together. Ninety per cent of the accounts would
thus be tested by the laws of states where only 10% of the credit was extended. Yet the
only valid justification for using a law other than that of the chief place of doing business
is that the state where a creditor may have been induced to extend credit should govern
the validity of a lien. If this policy is to be effectuated, the total amount of accounts
would have to be apportioned in relation to the percentage of credit extended at each
branch and tested accordingly. See text following.
111. And conceivably the whole assignment would be void in bankruptcy under
the "part bad, all bad" doctrine of Brown v. Leo. See note 186 infra.
112. See note 53 supra.
113. See note 107 supra; cf. Koessler, Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 33 CALIF.
L. REv. 40, 41 (1945) (foreword by Professor Hanna): "Original extension of credit
is not based upon ostensible ownership but upon financial statements, business recom-
mendations and personal inquiry."
114. See L. Hand, J., in Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1926): "[T]he
doctrine [of Benedict v. Ratner] has nothing to do with ostensible ownership. Therefore
it can rest only upon some supposed conceptual repugnancy between the mortgage and
the reserved power, quite regardless of any evils which may result from their coupling."
115. Ibid.
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dating of accounts to escape preferential transfer treatment under section
sLxty of the Bankruptcy Act.116 The argument runs that proof of an assignee's
policing, and hence of the assignor's prompt delivery of proceeds, entails
records of remitted checks. Absent presentation of such evidence, a Benedict
violation is presumed; with such evidence, back-dating is impossible. But since
states adhering to the Benedict rule permit the assignor to substitute new
accounts in lieu of remitting proceeds,"17 back-dating safeguards are effectively
eliminated." 8 Finally, Benedict may be viewed as embracing a policy against
"too easy" security transfers." 9 Implementation of this policy requires more
than individual branch compliance. Over-all company observance of Benedict
strictures, dictated by the home office, would be necessary. In sum, since
reliance can only be induced and Benedict observed at an assignor's principal
place of business, the viability of both protective measures should be determined
by the law of that state.1
20
A principal place of business approach should also govern perfection require-
ments .12 1 Notice afforded by recordation of accounts receivable assignments
116. See Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 392, 395-96 (1952).
117. See note 22 supra.
118. Thus, the assignor and assignee could back-date a financing agreement to
some time prior to the four-month limit and then back-date schedules which were sup-
posedly shipped periodically and which appear to substitute new accounts arising during
the selected period for accounts whose proceeds were then collected and retained. The
assignment of new accounts would be viewed as made in consideration for the simultaneous
release of old collateral. They would therefore have been made for present consideration,
and be valid even though executed within four months of bankruptcy.
119. This policy underlies the requirement that a clear intention to preserve the prop-
erty as security must be shown. See National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231. U.S. 50 (1913);
Chapman v. Emerson, 8 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1925).
120. Similar arguments may be made with respect to the rule governing assignments
of future accounts. Short of a conceptualistic justification, Nmv YoRK LAW REvisioX
Comisussio , ASSGNhiENTS OF ACCOUNTs RECEIVABLE 65 (1946) ; see note 23 supra, the
rule must be premised on either protection of unsecured creditors or protection of assignors
against lenders who would force encumbrancing of all present and future property, see
note 101 supra. Certainly, the state of the assignor's principal place of business should
determine what safeguards are needed by assignors. As to protection of unsecured creditors,
the same law is most relevant, unless a multiplicity of jurisdictions is to be invoked. Multi-
plicity disadvantages are discussed in the earlier paragraphs of this section.
121. Some features of assignment transactions may require rules other than lex loci
commerciendi. In this connection, it is said that the contract, i.e., promise of assignment,
is quite different from the assignment proper which is a transfer of property. Judge Good-
rich, in In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946) ; 3 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWs 389, 412
(1950); Flanagan, supra note 61, at 422-23; WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 538
(2d ed. 1950). True, the underlying financing agreement in a receivables assignment is
different from the actual assignment of accounts effectuated periodically by the sending
in of new schedules. But this does not mean that different conflicts rules need be applied.
The reasons advanced for lcr loci conmuerciendi with respect to assignments are applicable
to the contract: the assignor's place of business is the most important single contact point,
and the assignor's jurisdiction is the one most affected by the financing arrangement which,
though susceptible of division into individual parts for the purpose of analysis, remains an
19581
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
is intended to benefit second assignees or an assignor's general creditors.1 22
Despite the existence of a multistate branch system, assignees probably
transact business directly at the assignor's head office. To the extent subse-
organic whole, a single commercial relationship. But, even if contracts were to be judged
by separate conflicts rules, the assignor's jurisdiction should still be chosen. Both the
center of gravity rule and the doctrine of party autonomy permit this result. And it will
coincide with the jurisdiction of performance of the arrangement in most cases. See notes
80-87 supra and accompanying text. Only lex loci contractus would be obstructive, but this
rule has limited vitality. NUSSBAUM, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 172-75 (1943). Argu-
ably, a different law may have to be applied to the contract in cases of stipulation. Such
stipulation, however, should be accorded equal recognition in contract and assignments,
though only as between parties. See note 48 supra. As against third parties, the stipula-
tion should be totally ineffective. Absent acceptance of lex loci comnmerciendi, courts
may be expected to make the contract-assignment distinction in two cases: (1) where the
court decides, for example, to use the debtor's domicile or law governing the assigned
debt versions of lex situs for the assignment (these contacts have even less connection
with the contract than with the assignment) ; and (2) where the usury laws are involved
and the court, following the tendency not to find contracts other than small loans usurious,
wishes to apply the law of a lenient jurisdiction. Conceivably, a flexible conflicts rule for
contracts, see NussAum, op. cit. supra at 182, could lead to such a jurisdiction, but no
established rule for assignments would do so; and thus the contract-assignment distinction
would become necessary.
Even were lex loci cominerciendi accepted, one aspect of the assignment arrangement
would require a separate rule. Generally, it is held that the place of assignment governs
the capacity to assign. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICTS § 351 (1934); 3 RABEL, CoNrFucT
OF LAws 404 (1950). Perhaps a more persuasive argument is that "the only state with
interest in capacity as such is the domicile of the person involved," except under special
circumstances. Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Toler-
ances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE LJ. 1087, 1119 (1956) ; cf. Dix v.
Bank of Cal. Nat'l Ass'n, 113 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Cal. 1952). At any rate, capacity
poses no real problem in a commercial context.
The assignability of an obligation is of considerably greater importance. See, e.g., dis-
cussion of the Caristo doctrine, note 46 supra. It is ordinarily tested either by the law of
the jurisdiction where the original contract was made, Dix v. Bank of Cal. Nat'l Ass'n,
supra; Barbin v. Moore, 159 Atl. 409 (N.H. 1932); RESTATEmENT, CONIcrs § 348
(1934) ; NussDAum, op. cit. supra at 181, or the law governing the assigned obligation,
Coleman v. American Sheet and Tin Plate Co., 285 Ill. App. 542, 2 N.E.2d 349 (1936) ; 2
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 348.2 (1935) ; DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 570 (6th ed. 1949) ;
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 341 (3d ed. 1949). The latter formulation is preferable since
it permits the account debtor to conform all aspects of his contract to only one law. Yet
both rules afford the debtor some predictability as to which law will determine to whom
he can safely make payment. And as neither rule is linked to any event connected with
the assignment, they properly recognize that the act of assigning should not change the
debtor's rights. Similarly, all suits by assignees against account debtors should be ruled
by the law governing the assigned contract. See 3 RABEL, op. cit. supra at 409-10. But see
RESTATE-mENT, CONFLICTS §§ 353-54 (1934), recommending the place of performance of
the assigned contract; accord, 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra §§ 353-54; Ozanic v. United States,
188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Warren v. Copelin, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 594 (1842).
The possibility of using a separate conflicts rule for double assignments is discussed in
note 78 supra. The same arguments advanced against separation of perfection and validity,
see note 150 infra, apply equally against proposals to treat formal aspects of assignments
differently. See CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 258 (4th ed. 1952).
122. See note 105 supra.
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quent assignee's investigate records, 23 therefore, they are more likely to search
in the assignor's principal place of business than in any other jurisdiction.
Moreover, unsecured creditors would receive little information of an assignor's
general business health through notice of an assignment arrangement in the
records of a branch state.'2 4 Accounts receivable financing in itself may be as
indicative of prosperity as of straitened conditions.1 25 To reveal the assignor's
ability to fulfill financial obligations, inquiries would have to be effected in
the home office. 1 26
INSTITUTING THE RULE
Mleclmnics of Application
While an assignor's principal place of business can ordinarily be designated
without ambiguity, unusual business structures may require a dispositive test.
Executive offices are generally considered the nucleus of any concern. When,
however, executive functions, accounting systems and amount of business
are distributed among several states, a principal place of business may appear
difficult to determine.'2 7 The Uniform Commercial Code recommends that
choice of law be geared to the location of account records; when records are
maintained at several offices, internal accounting practices should be decisive.' 28
If the site of ledger cards is contemplated as the controlling location, this
test may give rise to a branch office division of applicable law. 129 Another
possible explanation, however, is that the Code refers to the state in which
accounts receivable files are centralized. 130
123. See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
124. Such records fail to show the extent to which the company's property outside the
state is encumbered.
125. See note 16 supra.
126. See note 107 supra.
127. NEW YORK LAW REVISION CO2MMISSION, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
ARTIcLE NINE 92-93 (1955). See also UNIFORM COassERclAL CODE § 9-103(2), concerning
mobile equipment, which makes the law of the state of the borrower's chief place of business
applicable. Comment 3 to § 9-103, UNIFORM CO mMERCIAL CODE (1952 ed.), defines the chief
place of business as the place "from which in fact the debtor manages the main part of his
business operations.... Although under this formula ... there will be doubtful situations, the
subsection states a rule which will be simple to apply in most cases, [and] which will make
it possible to dispense with much burdensome and useless filing ......
128. The text of the Uniform Commercial Code refers merely to the office where
the assignor keeps records of accounts. UNIFORM CO2%I.MERCIAL CODE § 9-103(1). The
comment to this section recommends that in the case of multiple records internal account-
ing practice-which of the various records is controlling for general accounting purposes
of the enterprise--be determinative. UNIFORM COMMER IAL CODE § 9-103, comment 2
(1952 ed.).
129. If the language of the comment to § 9-103, see note 128 supra, is controlling, the
word "record" in § 9-103(1) most likely means the ledger cards for individual accounts,
which may well be kept at branch offices. But when an assignor uses accounting machines
with identically punched cards and maintains duplicates at branches as well as the chief
place of business, a ledger test would permit reference to the latter jurisdiction.
130. To avoid recourse to a multiplicity of state laws, courts should recognize that
Uniform Commercial Code comments are not enacted by the legislature. Moreover, the
1957 version of the Code omits § 1-102(3) (f) of the 1952 version which stated that com-
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Central accounting systems and principal executive offices are usually main-
tained at the same location; but when divergencies occur, the latter seems a
better index of applicable law. With main executive offices determinative,
assignment decisions would appropriately be confined within a legal frame-
work fixed by the state in which company policy is directed. On the other
hand, an accounting approach might be said to coincide with creditors' interests
in investigating corporate prosperity. While perhaps true in the rare case of
second assignees, 131 unsecured creditors, who most frequently challenge assign-
ments, 3 2 generally lack access to company records and must direct inquiries
to company personnel. 3 3 Conversely, under a main executive office solution,
public records of the headquarters state would contain accessible as well as the
most complete information.
Relocation
When an assignor relocates his principal place of business, the extent
of the continued applicability of the laws of the former home office state may
be drawn into question. Chattel removal cases are governed by a judicially
created rule generally holding perfected chattel liens valid until the lienor has
notice of the displacement. 13 4 Compliance with the laws of the new situs state
within a reasonable time is then necessary for continuation of a security inter-
est. 13 5 This requirement reflects a compromise between protecting mortgagees
ments may be consulted in the construction and application of the act. And the word
"record" in the text may be construed to mean the central accounting record.
Utilization of a records test for assignments in contrast to a chief place of business
rule for mobile equipment cases, § 9-103(3), is difficult to explain. Comment 3 situates
the chief place of business at "the place where persons dealing with the debtor would
normally look for credit information .... [which] is the appropriate place for filing."
Certainly, the same rationale applies to receivables financing-perhaps even more force-
ably-since the problem of creditors relying on chattels at a branch operation does not
arise. Nor does the records test permit more automatic application. Under both rules, as
the comment admits, doubtful situations will arise. See UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-103,
comment 3 (1952 ed.).
131. See note 50 supra.
132. Such challenge is made either directly or through the trustee in bankruptcy. See
note 108 supra.
133. Access to company records is, of course, a question of bargaining power. While
unsecured institutional lenders and powerful trade creditors may often obtain such access,
the majority of trade creditors and employees apparently cannot expect the assignor to
open his books to them.
134. See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICTS §§ 268, 275 (1934) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS
§§ 268.1., 268.2, 275.1, 275.2 (1935) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 156-57 (3d ed. 1949);
Lee, Conflict of Laws Relating to Installment Sales, 41. MICH. L. REv. 445, 448-52 (1942)
Note, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 767, 781-84 (1947) ; 7 WAsHl. & LEE L. REv. 45 (1950). But cf.
Leary, Horse and Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REV. 455
(1948), disclosing that while courts purport to respect the rule preserving liens on secretly
removed chattels, they often find ways to favor a local purchaser from the lienee.
135. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 275.2 (1935); UNiFOini CONDITIONAL SALES ACT
§ 14 (ten days after notice). Under § 14, "notice" has been construed to mean actual notice.
In re Bowman, 36 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1929).
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against secret removal and safeguarding unsecured creditors who may see a
chattel in its new location and rely on it for ultimate satisfaction. 36
In accounts receivable financing, the laws of the original state should re-
main applicable for the maximum maturity of commonly assigned receivables
-ninety days 37_. and be relevant only to accounts assigned and existing
before relocation. Since reliance concepts are not realistically germane to
intangible receivables, creditors of the new state cannot object to the length
of a ninety-day period, which affords assignees adequate time to conform assign-
ments of long-term installment accounts to the laws of the new jurisdiction.
Creditors in all branch office states may, however, rely on the legal relevance
of either the former or new headquarters jurisdiction. Reference to either
state's laws, consequently, should depend on the site of principal executive
offices at the time a disputed assignment was effected. Concurrently, a ninety-
day rule would protect assignees despite elimination of the notice factor. Re-
location of executive offices, unlike removal of chattels, entails sufficient notori-
ety.138 And since responsible assignees police accounts irrespective of Benedict
proscriptions, secret relocation would be virtually impossible. In fact, ninety
days seems particularly well suited to commercial interests. Receivables assigned
before relocation would retain the legal protection of the original state until
maturity, while after-moving assignments could be easily executed in compli-
ance with newly applicable laws.
Renvoi and Transmission
The utility of a ubniversal conflicts rule should not be impaired, as it is in the
Uniform Commercial Code, by concurrent application of renvoi and transmis-
sion theories. When litigation is initiated in a code state, section 9-103(1)
requires courts to consult the laws, including the conflicts rules, of the state
in which an assignor keeps his records. 139 While initially referring to the
assignor's place of business, and perhaps to his head office in multistate oper-
136. The UNIFORM COwmegilAL CODE § 9-103(3), applicable only to chattels, recog-
nizes the effectiveness of the old security interest for four months from the date of removal,
irrespective of notice to the secured party. Some states have similar statutes with varying
periods of time. Leary, supra note 134, at 475 & n.51. One of the advantages of such rules
is to eliminate the problem of proving notice.
137. Note, 101 U. PA. L. REa. 392 (1952). For the average length of time of out-
standing receivables in the factoring field, see Silverman, Factoring as a Financing Device,
27 HARV. Bus. Rav. 594, 605 (1949). Debts with a longer maturity may, of course, be as-
signed. See, e.g., N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW § 302(10), authorizing the assignment of retail
automobile installment purchase contracts.
138. In the case of an assignment by a nonbusiness assignor of a single unmatured debt,
an absolute 90-day rule may unduly burden an assignee in case of the assignor's disappear-
ance. Two solutions are possible: (1) to toll the 90-day limit as long as the assignee exer-
cises reasonable diligence in locating the assignor; or (2) to permit the assignee in such
a situation to protect himself against subsequent assignees and unsecured creditors by
notifying the account debtor.
139. UNIFORM CoMMERCIA. CODE § 9-103(1).
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ations, section 9-103 (1) may ultimately lead back to the forum's laws-renvoi, 140
or necessitate recourse to the laws of a third jurisdiction-transmission. 41
Renvoi and transmission are generally designed to achieve, irrespective of
forum, the result which would have been reached by courts in the borrower's
state. 142 Yet the comment to section 9-103 indicates that the code drafters were
principally concerned with protecting security interests in mobile equipment.143
For example, failure of a mortgagor's state to permit recordation of liens on
chattels located, and attached, in the code state would jeopardize security
interests if courts in the code state could only refer to the substantive laws
of the mortgagor's jurisdiction. When the conflicts rules of the mortgagor's
state-presumably lex situs-are also consulted, renvoi operates to uphold
those interests perfected by filing in the code jurisdiction. But since every
filing statute applicable to assignments permits recordation if an assignor's
principal place of business is situated in the state,14 4 this justification for renvoi
has no application in the context of accounts receivable financing and lea" loci
commerciendi. Another possible explanation for the Code's employment of
renvoi and transmission is that parties to chattel transactions may rely on the
applicability of the situs state's laws. And with near universal acceptance of
the lex situs rule,14 5 reference by courts in code states to the conflicts rules
of a borrower's jurisdiction would complement such expectations. However,
since no one doctrine enjoys general acceptance in assignment litigation, 14
resorting to the conflicts rule of an assignor's state may lead to the laws of any
contact jurisdiction. Should the assignor's state also countenance transmission,
the laws of a fourth jurisdiction may be deemed relevant.
Instead of enhancing certainty, then, transmission would compound unpre-
dictability in the receivables area. Furthermore, in view of existing uncertain-
ties as to the ultimate choice of law, counsel ordinarily advise financing parties
140. For example, the state where the assignor keeps his records may adhere to a
place of assignment rule and the assignment may have been made in the code-forum-
state.
141. Transmission has been opposed by commentators who endorse renvoi. See, e.g.,
NussBAum, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 99-100 (1943).
142. Cf. RESTATEIM NT, CONFLICTS § 8 (1934) ; Matter of Schneider, 198 Misc. 1017,
96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
143. Comment 5 to § 9-103, U.IFoni CoarmmcIAL CODE (1952 ed.), is applicable to
both §§ (1) and (2) of § 9-103. Subsection (2) deals with the choice of law in the case
of security interests in "goods of a type which are normally used in more than one juris-
diction (such as automotive equipment, rolling stock, airplanes, roadbuilding equipment
• . . and the like) . .. ."
144. See text at notes 150-70 infra. Ohio may be a possible exception. The statute is
applicable only when the ledgers of accounts are kept in Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1325.02 (Page Supp. 1957). Should the assignor's principal place of business be located
in Ohio, some ledgers would most likely be kept there. But even if ledgers were not main-
tained at this office, notice could be filed in Ohio since accounts are not required to exist
at the time of filing (§ 1325.04).
145. See note 58 supra.
146. See note 52 supra.
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to comply with at least the laws of the assignor's jurisdiction.1 47 Transmission
could, therefore, combine with lex loci connzerciendi to frustrate the expecta-
tions of assignment parties, and by recourse to an outmoded rule, add further
precedent against an assignor's home office solution. In fact, since any prece-
dent attained by traditional doctrine is likely to have been established in cases
concerning single-debt assignments, 14s adherence to renvoi and transmission
in the receivables area could yield a conflicts rule which even courts in the
assignor's state would not follow.' 4 9 On the other hand, upon consulting the
laws of the assignor's jurisdiction, code state courts might find the conflicts
precedent too questionable to activate renvoi or transmission.
Statutory Implications
In determining choice of law in multistate receivables transactions, courts
may consult the recordation statutes of their own jurisdictions. Such statutes
commonly dictate the effects as well as the mechanics of filing. When an assign-
ment of accounts falls within the specific conditions of filing even though the
assignor's principal place of business is not in the jurisdiction, courts may
understandably be reluctant to apply lex loci commerciendi.1 0
147. See the article by counsel for the Mass. Bankers Ass'n, Malcolm, Conflicts of
Laws, Accounts Reccivable, Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1945, pp. 38, 42. The author indicates that
the law of the assignee's jurisdiction should also be observed. However, courts have never
applied the law of the assignee's state when no other contact was found in that jurisdiction.
148. Cases involving assignments for the benefit of creditors-usually 19th century-
constitute a substantial portion of whatever precedent is to be found in this area.
149. Outmoded precedent also presents a problem when federal courts use the conflicts
rule of the state in which they sit. See note 180 infra. In both cases, the courts may feel
bound by questionable precedent which has not been overturned by the state courts either
because new cases have not arisen or because fact situations in new cases permitted use
of old doctrines to arrive at acceptable results.
150. Courts may reason that since the legislature provided for filing in a certain county
under certain circumstances, e.g., in the county where the transaction occurred if the as-
signor had no business or residence in the state (Iowa), it must intend the law of the
state to apply to the validity as well as the perfection of assignments. The term perfection
usually embraces such formalities as recording, acknowledgment, etc. Under validation
statutes, perfection would simply entail the act of assignment; in English rule states-
notification of account debtors; in recordation states-filing of notice; and in North Dakota
-marking of the assignor's books. Validity, in this context, may be viewed as the pro-
tection afforded an assignee as against all other parties, by virtue of perfection. Arguably,
perfection and validity may be distinguished, and the conflicts implications of recording
requirements confined to the former. While such a distinction would permit courts to
determine validity by the lex loci conmterciendi rule, it represents a poor compromise be-
tween multiple and single state law compliance. Besides placing on the assignee the burden
of filing, notifying and bookmarking in a great many states without in fact appreciably
increasing protection to creditors, see notes 121-26 supra and accompanying text, the per-
fection-validity distinction is open to other objections. Accounts receivable statutes prin-
cipally vary: (1) in the effect which they give to notification or filing as against other
assignees or creditors, in good faith or not, prior or subsequent; (2) in the applicability
of the statute to different kinds of accounts; and (3) in their acceptance or rejection of
Benedict v. Ratner and the assignability of after-acquired accounts. See notes 32-46 supra.
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Most recordation statutes, however, permit judicial application of the le"
loci commerciendi rule. Of the twenty-three statutes, 151 five merely provide
that notice of assignments shall be filed with the secretary of state.152 This
absence of legislative specificity allows courts discretion in selecting the con-
ditions under which the laws of their state apply. Three other statutes also
provide for filing with the secretary of state but only when the assignor's
principal executive offices are in the jurisdiction.15 3 In these states, lex loci
commnerciendi can be considered affirmatively suggested for choosing applicable
law in multistate assignment cases.
Further support for lex loci commerciendi may be derived, in some cases,
from the Uniform Commercial Code,5 4 enacted in two states,15 and from
the Ohio statute. These acts provide that the laws of the state, including filing
requirements, shall govern if ledgers-Ohio, or records-UCC, of accounts
are maintained in the jurisdiction. Thus, both embody le.r loci coin nzcrciendi
when the assignor's business is not divided into branches. Moreover, Ohio
courts, when presented with branch office assignment cases in which ledgers
are not kept in the state, could find basis in the statute's negative implications
for referring to the state in which account records are centralized. 1 6 By making
its laws applicable only when ledgers are situated in the state, the Ohio legis-
lature can be said to have recognized the predominant significance of this
contact point and the superior interest of a foreign jurisdiction when the con-
tact occurs elsewhere. Accordingly, in a single-state business situation, Ohio
courts could hold the laws of the assignor's state controlling. And because of the
undesirability of applying divergent laws of several states, central accounting
should dictate choice of law when assignors operate multistate branches. 15 7
Filing alone, in a given state, seems meaningless except in so far as it protects against
certain classes of people and sanctions certain practices. For the purpose of a statute is
certainly not implemented by giving its filing provisions a different effect from that con-
templated by the legislature. Perfection divorced from validity appears an empty gesture.
On the other hand, including the above items within a perfection definition would virtually
remove the attempted distinction. Thus, courts are not likely-perhaps properly to escape
conflicts implications derived from these statutes through use of a perfection-validity dis-
tinction.
151. See note 33 supra, listing the twenty-two filing statutes plus the Michigan statute,
which, though basically a validation statute, has filing requirements for certain circum-
stances.
152. Ariz., Idaho, Mo., Utah, Wash. Idaho has a separate statute codifying, in effect,
the rule of the assignor's state. See note 173 infra.
153. Colo., Fla., Kan. The exact terminology varies slightly: "principal business office
in the United States" (Colo.); "main executive office in the United States" (Fla., Kan.).
154. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 9-103(1).
155. Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. See note 33 supra.
156. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1325.03 (Page Supp. 1957), provides that notice shall
be filed in the county of the assignor's principal place of business in Ohio, or, if he has
none, where ledger sheets for the particular account are maintained. Section 1325.02 makes
the statute applicable only if the ledger sheet of the assigned account is maintained in Ohio.
157. 'Perhaps further support for this proposition may be derived from the statute's
reference to principal place of business in Ohio. See note 156 supra.
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While the location of central accounting and main executive offices will
sometimes differ,5 8 the solution appears more practicable than a branch
office division of applicable law.5 9 Reference to other states where records
are maintained, only negatively implied by the Ohio statute, is specifically
required by the UCC. Furthermore, should account records be kept at a branch
office in a UCC state, courts could impose a central accounting interpretation
on the code provision and view the assignor's state law as decisive.160 Un-
fortunately, Ohio courts would be forced to apply the laws of the forum when-
ever ledger cards were maintained at a branch in the state; statutory amend-
ment may therefore be indicated.
Eight other statutes support application of lex loci comnzerciendi in single-
state business cases. These statutes require notice of assignments to be filed
in the county of the assignor's principal place of business,161 five adding the
county of his residence if business offices are not situated in the state.16 2 That
this type of statute is not intended to apply when assignors have neither busi-
ness nor residence in the state has already been decided.16 3 That the foreign
jurisdiction containing the assignor's principal place of business should be
158. See text at notes 127-33 supra.
159. The branch office problem is discussed at notes 108-26 supra and accompanying
text.
160. See notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text. Renvoi and transmission, of
course, might pose obstacles. See text at notes 13941 supra.
161. Ala., Cal., Ga., La., Mich., N.C., S.C., Vt. For variations in the language of
these statutes, see notes 162, 164, 165 infra. For discussion of a California statute which
seems to require reference to the assignor's state, see note 173 infra.
162. Cal. Georgia requires filing in the county of the assignor's principal place
of business if the assignor is a corporation, a partnership or a -nonresident individual; if
a resident individual-the county of residence. The Michigan, North Carolina and South
Carolina statutes are very similar. The Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Texas statutes,
which also refer to the assignor's residence, are discussed separately in notes 168-70 infra
and accompanying text.
163. In Smith v. Harris, 127 Cal. App. 2d 311, 273 P.2d 835 (1954), one of the rare
cases arising under the new statutes and involving conflicts questions, a Texas borrower
assigned accounts receivable, including a California account, to a New York lender who
filed in Texas but not in California. A creditor of the assignor then tried to attach the
debt in California. The court held that while the place of assignment (New York) con-
trolled "formal validity," the law of the account debtor's domicile (California) governed
the necessity of notice, of recording or of taking possession in order to uphold the assign-
ment against third parties. However, since the assignor had neither place of business nor
residence in California, the court found the California statute inapplicable, adding that, in
the normal course of commercial transactions, credit responsibility is best ascertained at
the assignor's place of business or residence (Texas). The court then held the assignment
good under California common law and incidentally indicated its validity under New York
law and, because of filing, under Texas law. Having correctly pronounced the California
statute inapplicable and recognized that creditors should look to Texas records for infor-
mation, the court should have taken the logical step of holding Texas law controlling.
Reversion to common law, which the statute was clearly designed to supersede, was con-
trary to legislative intent. Moreover, the court ignored the availability of a California
statute requiring reference to the law of the assignor's state. See note 173 infra.
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consulted may be implied by the significance imported to this contact point
by the state legislatures. While language in three of the statutes would permit
courts to refer to the laws of the assignor's principal place of business when
branch offices are located in the forum, 164 other statutes in the group militate
against this result.165 And most suggest application of the forum's laws when
assignors reside in the jurisdiction. 166 Since accounts receivable financing is
normally conducted by corporations, the residence proviso should not unduly
constrict utilization of lex loci cornmerciendi.167 Branch office qualifications,
on the other hand, may constitute an obstacle which can only be remedied
by statutory amendment.
Legislation in four states may preclude adherence to the lex loci cominerci-
endi rule. The Oklahoma and Texas statutes provide for recordation at the
state capital if assignors have neither residence nor office within the state.',,
Similarly, the Nebraska statute requires recording in the account debtor's
164. The Georgia, Michigan and Vermont statutes require filing in the county (or
town) of the assignor's principal place of business. Since any firm is considered to have
only one principal place of business, the statutes of these states may be reasonably con-
strued as inapplicable when the principal place of business is elsewhere. Indeed, the Georgia
statute supports such an interpretation. For the definition of the phrase "principal office,"
it refers to § 92-2405 which indicates that one office wherever located-not principal office
within Georgia-is contemplated.
165. The Alabama and California statutes refer to the assignor's place of business in
the! state. The Alabama statute, however, merely states that any person "is entitled to file"
in the county referred to, while California states an assignment to be void unless so filed.
Alabama thus leaves room for an interpretation holding filing permissive when only a
branch office is located in the state.
The Louisiana statute requires filing in the parish in which the assignor's place of busi-
ness is located and specifies that each separate establishment at which business is conducted
is to be regarded as a separate place of business. Not only must the assignee file in Louis-
iana if the assignor has a branch there, he must file in each parish in which a branch is
located. The same result obtains under the North and South Carolina statutes which
specify that notice is to be filed in "any county wherein the assignor has a place of busi-
ness." Worse, if the assignor is a domestic or domesticated corporation, filing is also neces-
sary at its statutory principal place of business. If an assignor is incorporated in one of
these states but does no business there, filing will nevertheless be required.
The North Carolina statutes elsewhere provide that an account shall be deemed located
in that state: "(a) If the transaction out of which the account arose occurred in this State,
or if payment is to be made in this State, or (b) If the account has been transferred to this
State so that the place of payment of the account is in this State, or (c) In all other cases
where an account is deemed located in this State under general rules of law." No reference
to the significance of such location may be found in the statute. Yet a court might interpret
the provision to imply a lex sitas rule. See text at notes 58-73 supra, notes 168-70 infra.
But since the filing requirements are a more likely (and relatively more sensible) indica-
tion of legislative intent on conflicts questions, this provision should be viewed as designed
only for tax, inheritance and bankruptcy purposes. See note 179 infra.
166. See note 162 supra.
167. The statutes referring to residence, note 162 supra, pertain to individuals only,
and not to the legal domicile of corporations. When a nonincorporated businessman lives
in one of the five states listed, but conducts his business in another state, compliance with
the laws of both states will be necessary.
168. The Hawaii statute is similar in that it requires the filing statement to designate
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county of business or residence when assignors have no contact with the state.169
Absent remedial legislation, multistate receivables may be vulnerable to effective
garnishment in these states unless the filing requirements of the forum are
fulfilled. Again, Iowa's statute appears to prevent a lex loci commerciendi
solution by providing for recordation in the county where the transaction creat-
ing the account occurred if the assignor has no residence or office in the juris-
diction. To the extent courts consider such provisions dispositive on choice
of law, amendment will be prerequisite to universal acceptance of lex loci
commerciendi.70
Judicial Precedent
In jurisdictions where lex loci commerciendi is not obstructed by statute,
obsolete precedent can be justifiably overturned. Conflicts issues have arisen
principally in cases testing the assignment of individual debts.' 7 ' Future liti-
gation, however, is likely to involve the expanding institution of multistate
accounts receivable financing. Within this broadened framework, traditional
rules would be as impracticable for courts to apply as they are for parties to
follow. One outgrowth of the uncertainty caused by single-debt precedent
is that counsel advise financing parties to comply with at least the laws of the
assignor's jurisdiction.' 72 Accordingly, departure from outmoded conflicts
rules would not thwart commercial expectations. A further consequence ap-
pears in the regularity with which courts select the laws of the assignor's state
the assignor's chief place of business elsewhere whenever the assignor has no place of
business in the territory.
Conceivably, courts wishing to use lex loci coninwrciendi could interpret these clauses
as providing for voluntary rather than mandatory filing whenever the assignor has
neither residence nor office in the state. In view of the commercially senseless and destruc-
tive nature of multiple filing requirements, this construction does not seem unrealistic,
especially since precedent for voluntary filing exists. Thus, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 9-103(2) provides for permissive filing where filing is not allowed in the state
of the assignor's chief place of business. Even if this interpretation is accepted, the stat-
utes of these states would still have to be applied if a branch office is located in the state,
for both statutes refer to the assignor's principal office within the state and thus fall into
the group of statutes listed in note 165 supra.
169. If the assignor is a nonresident and has no place of business within the
state, notice shall be filed in the county of the account debtor's residence or at his prin-
cipal place of business in the state.
170. Should the courts consider these statutes dispositive on choice of law, the multi-
plicity failing of traditional doctrines would be compounded in that the conflicts rules
in any state would vary with the nature of the contacts involved. In Nebraska, the rule
would seem to be leax situs (i.e., the account debtor's residence) as long as the assignor
had no office in the state, but a branch office version of lez loci cominerciendi when the
assignor had such an office. In Iowa, the shift to such a version of lex loci coinnerciendi
would be from a place of assignment rule, in Oklahoma and Texas, from either lez situs
or place of assignment. These difficulties suggest that a permissive filing interpretation,
however tenuous it may be, is preferable, see note 168 supra; for such interpretation would
at least yield a commercially sensible result.
171. Moreover, all the major treatises on conflict of laws seem concerned solely with
transfers of individual debts.
172. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
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under variant constructions of traditional doctrines. 7 3 Ratification of lex loci
commerciendi would, therefore, represent more of a deviation in rationale
than in effect. Just as the business community has recognized that the utility
of receivables security transcends the assignment of a single debt, courts should
openly acknowledge that the conflicts problems in modern usage exceed the
aim and capacity of older doctrine.
In bankruptcy litigation, lex loci commerciendi can be established as part
of the federal common law. Pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co.,I74 federal courts hearing assignment cases on di-
versity jurisdiction must apply the conflicts rules of the state.175 The validity
173. A survey of case law shows that, while a place of assignment rule is most often
enunciated, the assignor's place of business or residence is ordinarily located in the same
jurisdiction as the place of assignment. Among cases in which these two contacts occur
in different jurisdictions, more courts choose the assignor's jurisdiction (under various
doctrines) than that of the assignment. The account debtor's, and even more so the as-
signee's, location, are contacts often found outside of the jurisdiction whose law is chosen.
Localizing other contact points, such as performance of the assigned obligation, perform-
ance of the assignment, etc., is too difficult, from the report of many cases, to present com-
parison.
Frequently, courts fail to isolate one selected rule, esipecially when many contact points
cumulate in the applicable jurisdiction, and merely list all the conflicts rules occasioning
the same result. See, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510, 517 (6th Cir. 1907) ;
Wishnick v. Preserves & Honey, Inc., 153 Misc. 596, 275 N.Y. Supp. 420 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
Even when a single rule is chosen, the court may well be willing to use a traditional doc-
trine uncritically as long as a satisfactory result is obtainable. Some cases have different
meanings for different critics-each reading the case to support his rule. Compare, e.g.,
the treatment of Lewis v. Bush, 30 Minn. 244, 15 N.W. 113 (1883), in 2 BEALE, CONFLIcT
OF LAWS § 354.1 (1.935) ; 3 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 425 (1950) ; STUmBE G, CONFLICT
OF LAWs 262 (1951) ; Flanagan, Assignments of Accounts Receivable and the Conflict of
Laws Under the Bankruptcy Act, 2 VAND. L. REv. 409, 417 (1949).
Lex loci conierciendi often coincides with the rule of the place of perform-
ance of the assigned contract. For payment of accounts usually occurs at the
assignor's place of business. Flanagan, supra at 422. Additional support for lex loci
cointerciendi may be derived from another traditional doctrine. Mobilia sequuntur per-
sonam holds that the law of the place where the transferor of personal property is located
governs the transfer of such property. Once widely followed in the case of chattel trans-
fers, the rule has been largely abandoned in favor of lex situ s. See LALIVE, THE TRANSFER
OF CHATTrS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws 34-43 (1955); ZAPHIRlOu, THE TRANSFER or
CHATTFELS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 17-24 (1956). Yet four states have codified
the doctrine: "If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile." CAL. Civ. CODE § 946; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-401 (Supp. 1957) ; 'MONT. RE.
CODES ANN. § 67-1101 (Supp. 1957); N.D. REv. CODE § 47-0701 (1943). While this stat-
ute has not been applied to commercial financing, it has been used in intangible cases.
Fenton v. Edwards & Johnson, 126 Cal. 43, 58 Pac. 320 (1899) ; Bruton v. Villoria, 138
Cal. App. 2d 642, 292 P.2d 638 (1956). Thus, the statutes may be viewed as codifying
lex loci commerciendi, especially since the assignor's domicile may give way to a "business
situs." Miller v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 432, 110 P.2d 419 (1941). But see Smith v. Harris,
127 Cal. App. 2d 311, 273 P.2d 835 (1954), note 163 supra.
174. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
175. The Klaxon case is too unequivocal and too firmly established to permit hope for
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of accounts receivable security, however, is most frequently litigated before
federal courts invoking bankruptcy jurisdiction.1 76 While the Supreme Court
has declined to rule whether Klaxton pertains to nondiversity suits, 17 7 two cir-
cuit courts have considered it inapplicable when jurisdiction is derived from
the Bankruptcy Act. 7 8 Moreover, Klaxon is criticized generally as facilitating
the very forum shopping that Erie sought to eliminate, 179 and specifically
any deviation from its holding short of legislative action. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 247,
251-56 (1952).
176. See, e.g., In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Zydney v. New York Credit
Men's Ass'n, 113 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1940).
177. McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 371 n.2 (1945) ; D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942).
178. In In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997, 999 (3d Cir. 1.946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835
(1947), Judge Goodrich stated his belief that a bankruptcy court is not bound by state rules
of conflicts. Yet he did not decide the point, presumably since state and federal law co-
incided in that case. Similarly, in In re American Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 470, 475
(6th Cir. 1945), aff'd on other grounds sub nora. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v.
Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946), the Sixth Circuit emphasized that Klaxon may not apply in
bankruptcy litigation, but again the question did not have to be decided. See also De Sylva
v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), where, after holding that the meaning of a term should
be determined by state law, the Court implied that it was free to determine applicable state
law.
Incorporation of conflicts rules into bankruptcy law is proposed by numerous com-
mentators. HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDALa COURTS AND THE FEDERAL Sys=E's 635-36
(1953); MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE II 0.03(45), at 356 (1949) ;
Flanagan, supra note 173, at 413; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal.Law,
54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 513-14 (1954); Mishkin, The Varioumess of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Riles for Decision, 105
U. PA. L. REv. 797, 806-08 (1957).
179. Clark, C.J., in Collins v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416, 419-20 (2d
Cir. 1956).
With Klaxon applicable in bankruptcy, federal courts would have to employ the diver-
gent conflicts rules obtaining in state jurisdictions. Thus, "shopping" for certain federal
courts could benefit assignees or trustees in bankruptcy. Forum shopping in bankruptcy is
possible to the extent that parties may choose between summary and plenary jurisdiction.
Assignees deemed in possession of accounts may either force the trustee to bring plenary
proceedings or voluntarily submit to summary action in the bankruptcy court. The trustee
cannot object to such voluntary submission. 2 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ' 23.09[5] (14th ed.
1956). The right to insist on a plenary action may be lost by filing a claim against the
bankrupt estate for the deficiency between the debt owed by the bankrupt and the collateral
securing it. For the assignee may be held to have thereby consented to a summary adjudi-
cation of the assignment's validity unless he expressly reserved the right to a plenary
action. 2 id. ff 23.08[6]; 4 id. ff 68.20; Kupfer, Accounts Receivable Financing: A Legal
and Practical Look-See (Part 2), The Practical Lawyer, Dec. 1956, pp. 55, 56. Whenever
property which the trustee attempts to recover is in actual or constructive possession of
the bankruptcy court, the trustee may proceed summarily in that court. 2 COLLIER, BANK.-
RUPTCY ff 23.05[1] (14th ed. 1956). The question whether or not an assigned chose in
action is in the bankruptcy court's constructive possession has been the subject of much
litigation, with the courts arriving at divergent results. 2 id. 1 23.05[4] nn.24 & 25. At-
tempting to reconcile these cases, one commentator suggests that "where there has been an
outright and complete assignment of the chose in action..., as distinguished from a mere
encumbrance of it, a summary proceeding will not lie, and a plenary suit is the proper
remedy." 2 id. U 23.05[4]. Accordingly, recourse arrangements would come under sum-
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in bankruptcy as frustrating the uniformity objectives of the act.180 When, as
mary jurisdiction while nonrecourse arrangements would necessitate plenary suits. But the
cases cited seemingly do not fully support this contention. It re I. Greenbaum & Sons Co.,
6 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), and In re Paramount Fireproof Door Co., 43 F2d
558 (E.D.N.Y. 1930), are illustrative. Accounts were assigned as security for loans, yet
the courts held the assignees to be in possession so as to require plenary actions. In the
Greenbaum case, the court noted that lack of possession in the assignee was evidenced by
the assignor's continued collection of accounts and failure to notify account debtors. In the
court's view, this consideration was outweighed, however, by the assignor's delivery of
ledger sheets and memoranda, as well as his compliance with the requirements of Benedict
v. Ratner. See note 17 supra. Cases holding that the trustee had constructive possession
involve either (1) partial assignments, in which case the courts reason that the partial
title remaining with the bankrupt justifies summary proceeding, Schwartz v. Horowitz,
131 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1942) ; In re Lafayette Agency, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ;
or (2) nonnotification financing arrangements in which the parties violated Benedict v.
Ratner, In re Prince, 89 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1937) ; In re Borok, 50 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1931) ;
In re Capitaine, 31 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.N.Y. 1940) ; cf. Street v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 61
F.2d 106 (9th Cir. 1932). The question remains as to the course of judicial action in cases
of financing arrangements not meeting Benedict requirements in jurisdictions not follow-
ing the Benedict rule. In any event, in ordinary receivables arrangements, assignees may
refuse to submit to summary jurisdiction.
When the assignee does not voluntarily submit to summary jurisdiction, the trustee
may bring a plenary suit in any court, state or federal, in which the bankrupt might have
initiated an action. Bankruptcy Act § 23, 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 46 (1952).
If the trustee proceeds under §§ 60, 67 or 70(e), he may bring the action in a federal court,
whether or not the bankrupt could have done so. Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(b), 67(e), 70(e)
(3), 52 STAT. 870, 878, 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b), 107(e), 110(e)(3) (1952). Of
the sections used to invalidate transfers, only the "strong-arm clause," § 70(c), 66 STAT.
430, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952), confines the trustee to state courts when the bankrupt
would have been so limited. The trustee's plenary action may be brought in the jurisdiction
of the assignee's residence, anywhere the assignee may properly be served with process
or in the jurisdiction where the property is located. 2 CoLLIER, BANKRuPcy ff 23.15[1]
(14th ed. 1956). When intangibles are involved, the trustee may try to establish situs at
any one of the places enumerated in the text at notes 60-65 supra. See also Andrews,
Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants, 49 YALE L.J. 241, 254-61
(1939). A wide choice of jurisdictions may consequently be available. Possibly, the as-
signee could initiate a prior action against the trustee in a district court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1655 (1952), to remove a "cloud upon the title to ... personal property within the dis-
trict." In Lockhart v. Mercer Tube & Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 301 (D. Del. 1943), a trans-
feree had obtained a default judgment clearing title to shares which the trustee had claimed
were fraudulently transferred. The court held that the default judgment was res judicata
against the trustee; it emphasized that the trustee's charge of fraudulent transfer had so
clouded the title to the shares as to impair their marketability. Whether analogous reason-
ing could be applied to a lien on receivables is uncertain, especially since courts split on
whether "personal property" within the meaning of the statute includes simple debts. Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d 208, 251-53 (1953). See, generally, Blume, Actions Quasi In Rem Under
Section 1655, Title 28, U.S.C., 50 MicH. L. Rv. 1 (1951).
The bankruptcy court, of course, may sit in the jurisdiction where the bankrupt has his
principal place of business, his residence or his domicile. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a) (1), 52
STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 11 (a) (1) (1952). But the choice among these jurisdictions
is not within the power of either the trustee or the assignee, unless the latter himself
brought the petition in bankruptcy.
180. See, generally, cases cited note 178 supra. By referring to state law, the Bank-
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in assignment cases, state conflicts rules generate jurisdictional accidents, a
federal rule of conflicts seems particularly desirable. Indeed, federal court
establishment of lex loci commerciendi would complement bankruptcy policy.
Through incorporation of state laws, the Bankruptcy Act recognizes state
interest in determining the conditions under which borrowers may place prop-
erty beyond the reach of general creditors. As a rule, lex loci commerciendi
would recognize the interests of the state most concerned with balancing
the conflicting claims of the bankrupt and his creditors. 181
ruptcy Act recognizes the desirability of not adding, as far as possible, further rules to
those with which a lender must comply in order to protect his security interest. This
objective is not inconsistent with the act's overall purpose of settling bankruptcy problems
in a uniform and orderly manner, irrespective of where litigation is brought. Through
using state conflicts rules, however, the courts would reduce uniformity without lessening
the requirements to which a security arrangement is subject. On the use of state rules of
conflicts, see Note, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1218-22 (1955).
Federal use of state laws of conflicts may be made more undesirable by the assumption
that federal courts cannot reappraise the validity of a case in point decided by a state court
of last instance, no matter how old the precedent or how out of time its doctrine. See Rehm
v. Interstate Motor Freight System, 133 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1943) ; Boston Cas. Co. v. Bath
Iron Works Corp., 136 F.2d 31 (st Cir. 1943). The rule has been extended to apply to
decisions by intermediate appellate state courts, unless the federal court is "convinced by
other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise." West
v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) ; Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field,
311 U.S. 169 (1940) ; Gettins v. United States Life Ins. Co., 221 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir.
1955) ("it is not for us to exercise our independent judgment, to look to other jurisdic-
tions, or to speculate as to what the Supreme Court of Ohio might some day decide").
Much criticism has been aimed at the rule. Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot-Extensions
of the Erie Case, 31 Ky. L.J. 99, 101-07 (1943) ; Clark, State Law in Federal Courts:
The Brooding Onnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-94 (1.946);
Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORaNELL L.Q. 494, 514-20 (1949). While
a litigant would have the opportunity to persuade a lower state court not to follow another
lower court decision--one not being bound by the other-the same litigant would be de-
prived of this opportunity in a federal court. Certain federal courts, therefore, have invented
fine distinctions whereby they are permitted to use their own judgment. Id. at 517-19.
In the recent case of Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the Supreme
Court seemed to suggest "that a state decision may be rejected if the decision itself or
other decisions on the same subject contain ambiguities or inconsistency of reasoning, or
if it is overshadowed by the logic of more recent authorities." 45 CALI. L. REV. 87, 89
(1957). Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, asserted that out-of-state authorities should
be used and that consideration should be given to the fact that the state's highest court has
not been too hesitant in overruling itself. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., supra at 205-12.
Such an attitude should do much to help federal courts unwilling to adopt federal conflicts
rules reach reasonable results in receivables financing cases even when they confront
strong traditional precedent in state courts. See also note 148 supra.
181. Application of a federal conflicts rule in bankruptcy, however, appears prob-
lematical in view of the strong tendency of lower federal courts to apply state conflicts rules
in other nondiversity cases. See, e.g., United States v. Henke Constr. Co., 157 F.2d 13,
23-24 (8th Cir. 1946) (action brought under Miller Act, but court emphasized fact that
suit was in nature of action on contract and did not involve construction of federal stat-
ute) ; Sprague Elec. Co. v. Cornell-Dubilier Elec. Corp., 62 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1945); In
re Wisconsin Cent. Ry., 63 F. Supp. 151 (D. Minn. 1945); Gonzales v. Tuttman, 59
F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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CONFLICTS PREVENTION
Risks inherent in prevailing conflicts rules can be diminished by financing
parties. While courts are unlikely to accept lex loci coinmerciendi within the
near future, parties themselves can counteract unpredictable choice of law by
decreasing the number of relevant jurisdictions. Careful planning simply en-
tails concentrating most significant events in one jurisdiction so that selection
of law will not appreciably vary despite the conflicts rule eventually employed.
More specifically, governing contracts should be executed in the assignor's
jurisdiction with stipulations for the laws of that state to apply. 182 All accounts
arising at branches should then be sent to the head office before delivery to
the assignee. With such precautions, the majority conflicts rule-place of
assignment-can be harnessed to the laws of the assignor's state. Similarly,
all aspects of performance should be effected in the assignor's jurisdiction. The
assignee can designate an agent in the state to regulate credit ratios and to
accept or reject receivables for assignment. Proceeds collected at branches
should first be transmitted to headquarters and then placed in a local bank
which should also manage credit advances. When feasible, accounts should be
made directly payable at the home office. If financing is conducted in noti-
fication form, account debtors should be directed to remit payments to the
assignee's bank or agent in the assignor's state. Accordingly, choice of law
under place of performance or center of gravity would not depart from a lex
loci commerciendi solution.' 83
Remaining contact points-the assignee's and account debtors' business
locations-create absorbable risks. Absent further contacts at the assignee's
place of business, the laws of his state have never been chosen to govern assign-
ment transactions. On the other band, with the situs of debts following account
debtors, 184 and lex situs supported by precedent or implied by statute, 185 the
laws of account debtors' states are possible selections. 186 Garnishment actions,
particularly those brought by resident creditors, may engender judicial pre-
182. Each schedule should contain such a stipulation. This, in most jurisdictions,
would be sufficient to insure application of lex loci corninerciendi in litigation between the
parties. See Note, 62 HARV. L. REv. 647 (1949). Courts, however, may reject stipulations
used to escape recording requirements. Id. at 654 n.67. The avoidance of small print in
the contract may be important to acceptance of the stipulation. Id. at 656. See also Annot.,
112 A.L.R. 124 (1938).
183. To avoid difficulties with the Uniform Comnercial Code or the Ohio statute,
see notes 154-60 supra and accompanying text, the assignor should keep his ledger sheets
at the principal place of business when commercially feasible.
184. See notes 63, 64 supra.
185. See notes 58-73 supra and accompanying text; notes 168-70 supra and accompany-
ing text.
186. Most disturbing, in this connection, is not the possible loss of a few accounts
whose debtors are located in a state in which the assignee failed to perfect the assign-
ment, but the "part bad, all bad" rule of Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926). There,
a mortgage covering real estate, chattels and fixtures was held entirely invalid because the
chattel security was bad under the rule of Benedict v. Ratner. See also Moore v. Bay,
284 U.S. 4 (1931) (although lien is good against all but creditors who became such prior
[Vol. 67 :402
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE FINANCING
dilections for the laws of the forum.18 7 Bankruptcy suits, however, should not
pose the lex situs problem. In such proceedings, whether summary or plenary,
the validity of the entire accounts receivable arrangement must usually be
determined. And the difficulty of interpreting laws in every state in which
account debtors may be found, as well as the problem of devising fair methods
of apportioning proceeds, 8 s makes lex situs an unlikely choice. Thus reduced,
conflicts risks may be subsumed by margins between the amount of credit extend-
ed and the face value of accounts assigned. Nevertheless, the uncertainties
caused by prevailing doctrines cannot be eliminated, nor sound prediction of the
validity of less propitiously planned financings approached, until lex loci cwin-
nierciendi is universally adopted.
to recordation, the trustee can invalidate the whole security). But see In the Matter of
Cable-Link Corp., 135 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (iloore v. Bay doctrine not
applicable where there is no existing creditor).
187. See note 70 supra. This tendency appears most strongly where a forum state
creditor attaches a debt in that state which had been assigned in another state. Some courts
have been very open in stating that a different rule will be used whenever a domestic
creditor is involved. See, e.g., Woodward v. Brooks, 128 Ill. 222, 20 N.E. 685 (1889).
188. See notes 109-10 supra and accompanying text.
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